10 PSTCHOLOGT. 



seem to seek to crowd it out of existence altogether. The 

 only reals for the neo-Hegelian writers appear to be rela- 

 tions, relations without terms, or whose terms are only 

 speciously such and really consist in knots, or gnarls of 

 relations finer still in infinitum. 



"Exclude from what we have considered real all qualities consti- 

 tuted by relation, we find that none are left." "Abstract the many 

 relations from the one thing and there is nothing. . . . Without the 

 relations it would not exist at all. " * " The single feeling is nothing 



that which suffers doth not know. . . . Sense that suffers from external 

 objects lies as it were prostrate under them, and is overcome by them. 

 . . . Sense therefore is a certain kind of drowsy and somnolent percep- 

 tion of that passive part of the soul which is as it were asleep in the body, 

 and acts concretely with it. . . . It is an energy arising from the body and 

 a certain kind of drowsy or sleeping life of the soul blended together 

 with it. The perceptions of which compound, or of the soul as it were half 

 asleep and half awake, are confused, indistinct, turbid, and encumbered 

 cogitations very different from the energies of the noetical part, . . . which 

 are free, clear, serene, satisfactory, and awakened cogitations. That is to 

 say, knowledges." Etc., etc., etc. (R. Cudworth: Treatise concerning 

 Eternal and Immutable ]\Iorality, bk iii. chap, ii.) Similarly Male- 

 branche: "Theodore. — Oh, oh, Ariste! God knows pain, pleasure, warmth, 

 and the rest. But he does not feel these things. He knows pain, since he 

 knows what that modification of the soul is in which pain consists. He 

 knows it because he alone causes it in us (as I shall presently prove), and he 

 knows what he does. In a word, he knows it because his knowledge has 

 no bounds. But he does not feel it, for if so he would be unhappy. To 

 know pain, then, is not to feel it. Ariste, — That is true. But to feel it 

 is to know it, is it not? Theodore. — No indeed, since God does not feel 

 it in the least, and yet he knows it perfectly. But in order not to quibble 

 about terms, if you will have it that to feel pain is to know it, agree at least 

 that it is not to know it clearly, that it is not to know it by light and by 

 evidence— in a word, that it is not to know its nature; in other words and to 

 speak exactly, it is not to know it at all. To feel pain, for example, is to 

 feel ourselves unhappy without well knowing either what we are or what 

 is this modality of our being which makes us unhappy. . . . Impose silence 

 on your senses, your imagination, and your passions, and you will hear the 

 pure voice of inner truth, the clear and evident replies of our common mas- 

 ter. Never confound the evidence which results from the comparison of 

 ideas with the liveliness of the sensations which touch and thrill you. The 

 livelier our sensations and feelings (sentiments) are, the more darkness do 

 they shed. The more terrible or agreeable are our phantoms, and the more 

 body and reality they appear to have, the more dangerous are they and fit 

 to lead us astray." (Entretiens sur la Metaphysique, 3me Entretien, ad 

 mil.) Malebranche's Theodore prudently does not try to explain how- 

 God's ' infinite felicity ' is compatible with his not feeling joy. 

 * Green: Prolegomena, §§ 30, 38. 



