SENSATION. 33 



Another confusion, much more common than the denial 

 of all objective character to sensations, is the assumption 

 that the J are all originally located msicZe the body and are pro- 

 jected outward by a secondary act. This secondary judg- 

 ment is always false, according to M. Taine, so far as the 

 place of the sensation itself goes. But it happens to hit a 

 real object which is at the point towards which the sensation 

 is projected ; so we may call its result, according to this 

 author, a veridical hallucination.'^ The word Sensation, to 



* Oa Intelligence, part ii. bk. ii. cbap. ii. §§ vii, viii. Compare such 

 statements as these: "The consequence is that when a sensation has for 

 its usual condition the presence of an object more or less distant from our 

 bodies, and experience has once made us acquainted with this distance, we 

 shall situate our sensation at this distance. — This, in fact, is the case 

 with sensations of hearing and sight. The peripheral extremity of the 

 acoustic nerve is in the deep seated chamber of the ear. That of the 

 optic nerve is in the most inner recess of the eye. But s^ill, in our 

 present state, we never situate our sensations of sound or color in these 

 places, but without us, and often at a considerable distance from us. . . . 

 All our sensations of color are thus projected out of our body, and clothe 

 more or less distant objects, furniture, walls, houses, trees, the sky, and the 

 rest. This is why, when we afterwards retlect on them, we cease to at- 

 tribute them to ourselves; they are alienated and detached from us, so far 

 as to appear different from us. Projected from the nervous surface in 

 which we localize the majority of the others, the tie which connected 

 them to the others and to ourselves is undone. . . . Thus, all our sensa- 

 tions are wrongly situated, and the red color is no more extended on the 

 arm chair than the sensation of tingling is situated at my fingers' ends. 

 They are all situated in the sensory centres of the encephalon; all appear 

 situated elsewhere, and a common law allots to each of them its apparent 

 situation." (Vol. II. pp. 47-53.)— Similarly Schopenhauer: "I will now 

 show the same by the sense of sight. The immediate datum is here 

 limited to the sensation of the retina which, it is true, admits of con- 

 siderable diversity, but at bottom reverts to the impression of light 

 and dark with their shades, and that of colors. This sen.sation is 

 through and through subjective, that is, inside of the organism and 

 under the skin." (Schopenhauer: Satz vom Grunde, p. 58.) This philoso- 

 pher then enumerates seriatim what the Intellect docs to make the origi- 

 nally subjective sensation objective: 1) it turns it bottom side up; 2) it 

 reduces its doubleness to singleness; 3) it changes its flatness to solidity; and 

 i) it projects it to a distance from the eye. Again: "Sensations are 

 what we call the impressions on our senses, in so far as they come to our 

 consciousness as states of our own body, especially of our nervous 

 apparatus; we call them perceptions when we form out of them the repre- 

 sentation of outer objects." (Helmholtz: Tonempfindungen, 1870, p. 101.) 

 —-Once more : " Sensation is always accomplished in the psychic centres, 

 but it manifests itself at the excited part of the periphery. In other words, 



