SENSATION. 43 



become seats for each other, as fast as experience associates 

 them together ; but that violates no primitive seat possessed 

 by any one of them. And though our sensations cannot 

 then so analyze and talk of themselves, yet at their very 

 first appearance quite as much as at any later date are they 

 cognizant of all those qualities which we end by extracting 

 and conceiving under the names of objectivity, exteriority, 

 and extent. It is surely subjectivity and interiority which 

 are the notions latest acquired by the human mind. * 



picture and to feel the picture's position as related to other objects of space. 

 But the truth is that the picture is non-existent either as a habitat or as any- 

 thing else, for immediate consciousness. Our notion of it is an enormous- 

 ly late conception. The outer object is given immediately with all those 

 qualities which later are named and determined in relation to other sensa- 

 tions. The ' bottom ' of this object is where we see what by touch we 

 afterwards know as onvfeet, the ' top ' is the place in which we see what 

 we know as other people's heads, etc. , etc. Berkeley long ago made this 

 matter perfectly clear (see his Essay towards a new Theory of Vision, 

 §§ 93-98, 113-118). 



* For full justification the reader must see the next chapter. He may 

 object, against the summary account given now, that in a babe's immediate 

 field of vision the various things which appear are located relatively to each 

 oilier from the outset. I admit that if discriminated, they would appear so 

 located. But they are parts of the content of one sensation, not sensations 

 separately experienced, such as the text is concerned with. The fully de- 

 veloped 'world,' in which all our sensations ultimately find location, is 

 nothing but an imaginary object framed after the pattern of the field of 

 vision, by the addition and continuation of one sensation upon another in 

 an orderly and systematic way. In corroboration of my text I must refer 

 to pp. 57-60 of Riehl's book quoted above on page 33, and to Uphues : 

 Wahrnehmung und Empfindung (1888), especially the Einleitung and 

 pp. 51-61. 



