THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 103 



right of the original position occupied by my head when I awakened, the 

 ghost disappeared, and by returning to about the same position, I could 

 make it reappear with nearly the same intensity as at first. I presently 

 satisfied myself by these experiments that the illusion arose from the 

 effect of the imagination, aided by the actual figure made by a visual 

 section of the moonbeams shining through the lace curtains of the win- 

 dow. If I had given way to the first terror of the situation and cov- 

 ered up my head, I should probably have believed in the reality of the 

 apparition, since I have not by the slightest word, so far as I know, ex- 

 aggerated the vividness of my feelings." 



THE PHYSIOLOGICAL PROCESS IN PERCEPTION". 



Enougli lias now been said to prove tlie general law of 

 perception, which is this, that lohilst part of what we per- 

 ceive comes through our senses from the object before us, another 

 part (and it may be the larger part) always comes (in Laza- 

 rus' s phrase) out of our oivn head. 



At bottom this is only one case (and that the simplest 

 case) of the general fact that our nerve-centres are an organ 

 for reacting on sense-impressions, and that our hemispheres, 

 in j^articular, are given us in order that records of our private 

 past experience may co-operate in the reaction. Of course 

 such a general way of stating the fact is vague ; and all those 

 who follow the current theory of ideas will be prompt to 

 throw this vagueness at it as a reproach. Their way of de- 

 scribing the process goes much more into detail. The sen- 

 sation, they say, awakens ' images ' of other sensations asso- 

 ciated with it in the past. These images ' fuse,' or are * com- 

 bined ' by the Ego with the present sensation into a new 

 product, the percept, etc., etc. Something so indistinguish- 

 able from this in practical outcome is what really occurs, 

 that one may seem fastidious in objecting to such a state- 

 ment, specially if have no rival theory of the elementary 

 processes to propose. And yet, if this notion of images 

 rising and flocking and fusing be mythological (and we have 

 all along so considered it), why should we entertain it unless 

 confessedly as a mere figure of speech? As such, of course, 

 it is convenient and welcome to pass. But if we try to put 

 an exact meaning into it, all we find is that the brain reacts 

 by paths which previous exj^eriences have worn, and makes 

 us usually perceive the probable thing, i.e., the thing by 



