THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 10& 



and of children, consists of masses or circles of knowledge of whick 

 each lies within some larger circle, alongside of others similarly in- 

 cluded, and of which each includes smaller circles within itself. . . , 

 The perception of a thing like a horse ... is a process between the 

 present horse's picture before our eyes, on the one hand, and those fused 

 or interwoven pictures and ideas of all the horses we have ever seen, on 

 the other; ... a process between two factors or momenta, of which 

 one existed before the process and was an old possession of the mind 

 (the group of ideas, or concept, namely), whilst the other is but just 

 presented to the mind, and is the immediately supervening factor (the: 

 sense-impression). The former apperceives the latter; the latter is. 

 apperceived by the former. Out of their combination au apperception- 

 product arises: the knowledge of the perceived being as a horse. The- 

 earlier factor is relatively to the later one active and a priori ; the super- 

 vening factor is given, a 2Msteriori., passive. . . . We may then define' 

 Apperception as the movement of tw'o masses of consciousness (Vorstel- 

 lungsmassen) against each other so as to produce a cognition. 



" The a priori factor we called active, the a posteriori factor passive 

 but this is only relatively true. . . . Although the a priori moment 

 commonly shows itself to be the more powerful, apperception- processes 

 can perfectly well occur in which the new observation transforms or en- 

 riches the apperceiving group of ideas. A child who hitherto has seen 

 none but four-cornered ta])les apperceives a round one as a table; but 

 by this the apperceiving mass (' table') is enriched. To his previous 

 knowledge of tables comes this new feature that they need not be four- 

 cornered, but may be round. In the history of science it has happened 

 often enough that some discovery, at the same time that it was apper- 

 ceived, i.e. brought into connection with the system of our knowledge, 

 transformed the whole system. In principle, however, we must maintain 

 that, although either factor is both active and passive, the a priori factor 

 is almost always the more active of the two." * 



This account of Steintlial's brings out very clearly the 

 difference between our psycliological conceptions and what are 

 called concepts in logic. In logic a concept is unalterable ; but 

 ■what are popularly called our * conceptions of things ' alter 

 by being used. The aim of * Science ' is to attain concep- 

 tions so adequate and exact that we shall never need to 

 change them. There is an everlasting struggle in every 

 mind between the tendency to keep unchanged, and the 

 tendency to renovate, its ideas. Our education is a cease- 

 less compromise between the conservative and the pro- 

 gressive factors. Every new experience must be disposed 



* Op. at. pp. 166-171. 



