146 PSYCHOLOGY. 



present ones behind imagined ones that it is no wonder if 

 some authors have gone so far as to think that the sense- 

 data have no spatial worth at all, and that the intellect, 

 since it makes the subdivisions, also gives the spatial 

 quality to them out of resources of its own. 



As for ourselves, having found that all our sensations 

 (however as yet unconnected and undiscriminated) are of 

 extensive objects, our next problem is : Hoio do we areange 

 tliese at first chaotically given spaces into the one regular and 

 orderly ' world of space ' ichich we now know ? 



To begin with, there is no reason to suppose that the 

 several sense-spaces of which a sentient creature may 

 become conscious, each filled with its own peculiar content, 

 should tend, simply because they are many, to enter into 

 any definite spatial intercourse with each other, or lie in 

 any particular order of positions. Even in ourselves we 

 can recognize this. Different feelings may coexist in us 

 without assuming any particular spatial order. The sound 

 of the brook near which I write, the odor of the cedars, the 

 comfort with which my breakfast has filled me, and my in- 

 terest in this paragraph, all lie distinct in my consciousness, 

 but in no sense outside or alongside of each other. Their 

 spaces are interfused and at most fill the same vaguely ob- 

 jective world. Even Avhere the qualities are far less dis- 

 parate, we may have something similar. If we take our 

 subjective and corporeal sensations alone, there are moments 

 when, as we lie or sit motionless, we find it very difiicult to 

 feel distinctly the length of our back or the direction of our 

 feet from our shoulders. By a strong effort we can succeed 

 in dispersing our attention impartially over our whole per- 

 son, and then we feel the real shape of our body in a sort 

 of unitary way. But in general a few parts are strongly 

 eniphasized to consciousness and the rest sink out of notice ; 

 and it is then remarkable how vague and ambiguous our 

 perception of their relative order of location is. Obviously, 

 for the orderly arrangement of a multitude of sense-spaces 

 in consciousness, something more than their mere separate 

 existence is required. What is this further condition? 



If a number of sensible extents are to be perceived alongside 



