196 PSYCHOLOGY. 



and with its place as thus known, the place which the joint- 

 feeling fills must coalesce. That the latter should be felt 

 ' in the elbow ' is therefore a ' projection ' of it into the place 

 of another object as much as its being felt in the finger-tip 

 or at the end of a cane can be. But when we say ' projec- 

 tion ' we generally have in our mind the notion of a there as 

 contrasted with a here. "What is the here when we say that the 

 joint- feeling is there? The 'here' seems to be the spot 

 which the mind has chosen for its own post of observation, 

 usually some place within the head, but sometimes within 

 the throat or breast — not a rigorously fixed spot, but a 

 region from any portion of wdiicli it may send forth its vari- 

 ous acts of attention. Extradition from either of these 

 regions is the common law under which we perceive the 

 whereabouts of the north star, of our own voice, of the con- 

 tact of our teeth with each other, of the tip of our finger, 

 of the point of our cane on the ground, or of a movement 

 in our elbow-joint. 



But/or the distance between the ' here ' and the ' there ' to be 

 felt, the entire intervening space must be itself an object of per- 

 teption. The consciousness of this intervening space is the 

 sine qua non of the joint-feeling's projection to the farther 

 end of it. When it is filled by our own bodily tissues (as 

 where the projection only goes as far as the elbow or fin- 

 ger-tip) we are sensible of its extent alike by our eye, by 

 our exploring movements, and by the resident sensations 

 which fill its length. When it reaches beyond the limits 

 of our body, the resident sensations are lacking, but limbs 

 and hand and eye suffice to make it known. Let me, for 

 example, locate a feeling of motion coming from my elbow- 

 joint in the point of my cane a yard beyond my hand. 

 Either I see this yard as I flourish the cane, and the seen 

 end of it then absorbs my sensation just as my seen elbow 

 might absorb it, or I am blind and imagine the cane as an 

 object continuing my arm, either because I have explored 

 both arm and cane with the other hand, or because I have 

 pressed them both along my body and leg. If I project my 

 joint-feeling farther still, it is by a conception rather than a 

 distinct imagination of the space. I think : ' farther,' ' thrice 

 as far,' etc.; and thus get a symbolic image of a distant 



