THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 287 



to subject may be one. But wlien we liave got our object 

 with its inner constitution thus defined in a proposition, 

 then the question comes up regarding the object as a whole : 

 * Is it a real object ? is this proposition a true proposition 

 or not ? ' And in the answer Yes to this question lies that 

 new psychic act which Brentano calls 'judgment,' but which 

 T prefer to call ' belief.' 



In every proposition, then, so far as it is believed, ques- 

 tioned, or disbelieved, four elements are to be distinguished, 

 the subject, the predicate, and their relation (of whatever 

 sort it be) — these form the object of belief— and finally the 

 psychic attitude in which our mind stands towards the 

 proposition taken as a whole — and this is the belief itself.* 



Admitting, then, that this attitude is a state of conscious- 

 ness sui generis, about which nothing more can be said in 

 the way of internal analysis, let us proceed to the second 

 way of studying the subject of belief: Under ivhat circum- 

 stances do ive think things real ? We shall soon see how much 

 matter this gives us to discuss. 



THE VARIOUS ORDERS OP REALITY. 



Suppose a new-born mind, entirely blank and waiting 

 for experience to begin. Suppose that it begins in the 

 form of a visual impression (whether faint or vivid is im- 

 material) of a lighted candle against a dark background, 

 and nothing else, so that whilst this image lasts it consti- 

 tutes the entire universe known to the mind in question. 

 Suppose, moreover (to simplify the hypothesis), that the 

 candle is only imaginary, and that no ' original ' of it is 

 recognized by us psychologists outside. Will this hallu- 

 cinatory candle be believed in, will it have a real existence 

 for the mind ? 



What possible sense (for that mind) would a suspicion 

 have that the candle was not real ? What would doubt or 

 disbelief of it imply ? When we, the onlookiug psycholo- 

 gists, say the candle is unreal, we mean something quite 

 definite, viz., that there is a world known to us which is 



* For an excellent account of the history of opinion on this subject 

 see A. Marty, in Vierteljahrsch. f. wiss. Phi'i., vm. I6l H. (I8b4j. 



