290 P8TCH0L0OT. 



attributive respectively. * The candle exists as an outer 

 reality ' is an existential, * My Maggie lias got a pair of 

 wings ' is an attributive, proposition ;* and it follows from 

 what was first said that all propositions, ivhether attributive 

 or existential, ai'e believed through the very fact of being con- 

 ceived, unless they clash ivith other propositions believed at the 

 same time, by affirming that their terms are the same with the 

 terms of tJiese other propositions. A dream-candle has exist- 

 ence, true enough ; but not the same existence (existence 

 for itself, namely, or extra mentem meam) which the candles 

 of waking perception have. A dream-horse has wings ; but 

 then neither horse nor wings are the same with any horses 

 or wings known to memory. That we can at any moment 

 think of the same thing which at any former moment we 

 thought of is the ultimate laAv of our intellectual constitu- 

 tion. But when we now think of it incompatibly with our 

 other ways of thinking it, then we must choose which way 

 to stand by, for we cannot continue to think in two contra- 

 dictory ways at once. The tvhole distinction of real and un- 

 real, the ivhole psychology of belief, disbelief, and doubt, is thus 

 grounded on tivo mental facts — -frst, that ive are liable to think 

 differently of the same ; and second, that when we have done so, 

 tve can choose tvhich ivay of thinking to adhere to and ivhich to 

 disregard. 



The subjects adhered to become real subjects, the at- 

 tributes adhered to real attributes, the existence adhered 

 to real existence ; whilst the subjects disregarded become 

 imaginary subjects, the attributes disregarded erroneous 



* In both existential and attributive judgments a synthesis is repre- 

 sented. The syllable ex in the word Existence, da in the word Dasein, ex- 

 press it. ' The candle exists ' is equivalent to ' The candle is omr there! 

 And the ' over there' means real space, space related to other reals. The 

 proposition amounts to saying : ' The candle is in the same space with 

 other reals.' It affirms of the candle a very concrete predicate — namely, 

 this relation to other particular concrete things. Their real existence, as 

 we shall later see, resolves itself into their peculiar relation to ourselves. 

 Existence is thus no substantive quality when we predicate it of any ob- 

 ject ; it is a relation, ultimately terminating in ourselves, and at the mo- 

 ment when it terminates, becoming a practical relation. But of this more 

 anon. I only wish now to indicate the superficial nature of the distinctioa 

 between the existential and the attributive proposition. 



