'2^2 PSYCHOLOGY. 



(1) The world of sense, or of physical ' things ' as we 

 instinctively apprehend them, with such qualities as heat, 

 color, and sound, and such ' forces ' as life, chemical affinity, 

 gravit}^, electricity, all existing as such within or on the 

 surface of the things. 



(2) The world of science, or of physical things as the 

 learned conceive them, with secondary qualities and ' forces ' 

 (in the popular sense) excluded, and nothing real but solids 

 and fluids and their 'laws ' (i.e., customs) of motion.* 



(3) The world of ideal relations, or abstract truths be- 

 lieved or believable by all, and expressed in logical, mathe- 

 matical, metaphysical, ethical, or aesthetic proj)ositions. 



(4) The world of ' idols of the tribe,' illusions or preju- 

 dices common to the race. All educated j)eople recognize 

 these as forming one sub-universe. The motion of the sky 

 round the earth, for example, belongs to this world. That 

 motion is not a recognized item of any of the other worlds ; 

 but as an * idol of the tribe ' it really exists. For certain 

 philosophers * matter ' exists only as an idol of the tribe. 

 For science, the ' secondary qualities ' of matter are but 

 'idols of the tribe.' 



(5) The various supernatural worlds, the Christian 

 heaven and hell, the world of the Hindoo mythology, the 

 world of Swedenborg's visa et audita, etc. Each of these is 

 a consistent system, with definite relations among its own 

 parts. Neptune's trident, e.g., has no status of reality what- 

 ever in the Christian heaven ; but within the classic Olym- 

 pus certain definite things are true of it, whether one believe 

 in the reality of the classic mythology as a whole or not. 

 The various worlds of deliberate fable may be ranked with 

 these worlds of faith — the world of the Iliad, that of King 

 Lear, of the Pickivick Papers, etc.f 



* I define the scientific universe here in the radical mechanical way. 

 Practically, it is oftener thought of in a mongrel way and resembles in 

 more points the popular physical world. 



f It thus comes about that we can say such things as that Ivanhoe 

 did not really marry Rebecca, as Thackeray falsely makes him do. The 

 real Ivanhoe-world is the one which Scott wrote down for us. In tJiat 

 world Ivanhoe does not marry Rebecca. The objects within that world 

 are knit together by perfectly definite relations, which can be afiirmed 

 or denied. Whilst absorbed in the novel, we turn our backs on all othel 



