THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 295 



SO." The mere fact of appearing as an object at all is not 

 enough to constitute reality. That may be metaphysical 

 realit}-, reality for God ; but what we need is -pr&ciical 

 reality, reality for ourselves; and, to have that, an object 

 must not only appear, but it must appear both interesting 

 and important. The worlds whose objects are neither in- 

 teresting nor important we treat simply negatively, we 

 brand them as ?mreal. 



In the relative sense, then, the sense in which we contrast 

 reality with simple wwreality, and in which one thing is 

 said to have more reality than another, and to be more be- 

 lieved, reality means sifnply relation to our emotional and 

 active life. This is the only sense which the word ever has 

 in the mouths of practical men. In this sense, whatever ex- 

 cites and stimulates our interest is real ; whenever an object 

 so appeals to us that we turn to it, accept it, fill our mind 

 with it, or practically take account of it, so far it is real for 

 us, and we believe it. Whenever, on the contrary, we 

 ignore it, fail to consider it or act upon it, despise it, reject 

 it, forget it, so far it is unreal for us and disbelieved. 

 Hume's account of the matter was then essentially correct, 

 when he said that belief in anything was simply the having 

 the idea of it in a lively and active manner : 



" I say, then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, 

 firm, steady conception of an object than the imagination alone is ever 

 able to attain. ... It consists not in the i^eculiar nature or order of 

 the ideas, but in the manner of their conception and in W\^\v feeling to 

 the mind. I confess that it is impossible perfectly to explain this feel- 

 ing or manner of conception. ... Its true and proper name ... is 

 belief, which is a term that everyone sufficiently understands in common 

 life. And in philosophy we can go no farther than assert that belief is 

 something felt by themind, which distinguishes the idea of the judg- 

 ment from the fictions of the imagination.* It gives them more weight 

 and influence ; makes them appear of greater importance ; enforces 

 them in the mind ; gives them a superior influence on the passions, and 

 renders them the governing principle in our actions. " t 



* Distinguishes realities from unrealities, the essential from the rubbishy 

 and neglectable. 



f Inquiry concerning Hum. Understanding, sec. v. pt. 2 (slightly trans- 

 posed in my quotation). 



