SOO PSYCHOLOGY. 



discrepancies and contradictions are felt and must be set- 

 tled in some stable way. As a rule, the success with which 

 a contradicted object maintains itself in our belief is pro- 

 portif)nal to several qualities which it must possess. Of 

 these the one which would be put first by most people, 

 because it characterizes objects of sensation, is its — 



(1) Coerciveuess over attention, or the mere power to 

 possess consciousness : then follow — 



(2) Liveliness, or sensible pungency, especially in the 

 way of exciting pleasure or pain ; 



(3) Stimulating effect upon the will, i.e., capacity to 

 arouse active impulses, the more instinctive the better ; 



(4) Emotional interest, as object of love, dread, admira- 

 tion, desire, etc. ; 



(5) Congruity Avith certain favorite forms of contempla- 

 tion — unity, simj)licity, permanence, and the like ; 



(6) Independence of other causes, and its own causal 

 importance. 



These characters run into each other. Coerciveness is 

 the result of liveliness or emotional interest. What is lively 

 and interesting stimulates eo ipso the will ; congruity holds 

 of active impulses as well as of contemplative forms ; causal 

 independence and importance suit a certain contemplative 

 demand, etc. I will therefore abandon all attempt at a 

 iormal treatment, and simply proceed to make remarks in 

 the most convenient order of exposition. 



As a whole, sensations are more lively and are judged 

 more real than conceptions ; things met with every hour 

 more real than things seen once ; attributes perceived when 

 awake, more real than attributes perceived in a dream. 

 But, owing to the diverse relations contracted by the variovs 

 objects ivith each otJier, the simple rule that the lively and 

 permanent is the real is often enough disguised. A con- 

 ceived thing may be deemed more real than a certain sen- 

 sible thing, if it only be intimately related to other sensible 

 things more vivid, permanent, or interesting than the first 

 one. Conceived molecular vibrations, e.g., are by the 

 ph^'sicist judged more real than felt warmth, because so 

 intimately related to all those other facts of motion in the 



