THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 317 



a compromise, as we yield to the claim of tliis interest or 

 that, and follow first one and then another principle in 

 turn. It is undeniably true that materialistic, or so-called 

 •■ scientific,' conceptions of the universe have so far gratified 

 the purely intellectual interests more than the mere senti- 

 mental conceptions have. But, on the other hand, as 

 already remarked, they leave the emotional and active 

 interests cold. The perfect object of belief loould be a God or 

 ' Sold of the World,' represented both optimistically and moral- 

 istically (if such a combination could be), and ivithal so defi- 

 nitely conceived as to shoio us why ottr phenomenal experiences 

 should be sent to us by Him in just the very ivay in lohich they 

 come. All Science and all History would thus be accounted 

 for in the deepest and simplest fashion. The very room in 

 which I sit, its sensible walls and floor, and the feeling the 

 air and fire within it give me, no less than the * scientific * 

 concej)tions which I am urged to frame concerning the 

 mode of existence of all these phenomena when my back is 

 turned, would then all be corroborated, not de-realized, by 

 the ultimate principle of my belief. The World-soul sends 

 me just those phenomena in order that I may react upon 

 them ; and among the reactions is the intellectual one of 

 spinning these conceptions. What is beyond the crude 

 experiences is not an alternative to them, but something 

 that means them for me here and now. It is safe to say 

 that, if ever such a system is satisfactorily excogitated, 

 mankind will drop all other systems and cling to that one 

 alone as real. Meanwhile the other systems coexist with 

 the attempts at that one, and, all being alike fragmentary, 

 each has its little audience and day. 



I have now, I trust, shown sufficiently what the psycho- 

 logic sources of the sense of reality are. Certain postulates 

 are given in our nature ; and whatever satisfies those pos- 

 tulates is treated as if real.* I might therefore finish the 



* Prof. Royce puts this well in discussing idealism and the reality of an 

 ' external ' world. "If the history of popular speculation on these topics 

 could be written, how much of cowardice and shuffling would be found ia 

 the behavior of the natural mind before the question, ' How dost thou 

 know of an external reality ?' Instead of simply and plainly answering: 

 ' I mean by the external world in the lirst place something that I accept 



