322 P8TGH0L0OT. 



Those to whom ' God ' and ' Duty ' are now mere names 

 can make them much more than that, if they make a little 

 sacrifice to them every day. But all this is so well known 

 in moral and religious education that I need say no more.* 



* Literature. D. Hume : Treatise on Human Nature, part iir. §§ vii- 

 X. A. Bain : Emotions and Will, chapter on Belief (also pp. 20 ff). 

 J. Sully: Sensation and Intuition, essay iv. J. Mill: Analysis of Human 

 Mind, chapter xi. Ch, Renouvier : Psychologic Rationnelle, vol. ii. 

 pt. II ; and Esquisse d'une Classificalion systematique des Doctrines 

 Philosophiques, part vi. J. H. Newman: The Grammar of Assent. J. 

 Venn: Some Characteristics of Belief. V. Brochard : De I'Erreur, part 

 II. chap. VI, IX ; and Revue Philosophique, xxviii. 1. E. Rabier : Psy- 

 chologic, chap XXI. Appendix. OlleLaprune: La Certitude Morale (1881). 

 G. F. Stout: On Genesis of Cognition of Physical Reality, in ' Mind,' Jan. 

 1890. J. Pikl^r: The Psychology of the Belief in Objective Existence 

 (London, 1890).— Mill says that we believe present sensations ; and makes 

 our belief in all other things a matter of association with these. So far so 

 good; but as he makes no mention of emotional or volitional reaction. Bain 

 rightly charges him with treating belief as a purely intellectual state. For 

 Bain belief is rather an incident of our active life. When a thing is such 

 as to make us act on it, then we believe it, according to Bain. " But how 

 about past things, or remote things, upon which no reaction of ours is pos- 

 sible? And how about belief in things which c/i^cA action?" says Sully; 

 who considers that we believe a thing only when " the idea of it has an in- 

 herent tendency to approximate in character and intensity to a sensation." 

 It is obvious that each of these authors emphasizes a true aspect of the 

 question. My own account has sought to be more complete, sensation, 

 association, and active reaction all being acknowledged to be concerned. 

 The most compendious possible formula perhaps would be that our belief 

 and attention are the same fact. For the moment, what we attend to is 

 reality ; Attention is a motor reaction; and we are so made that sensations 

 force attention from us. On Belief and Conduct see an article by Leslie 

 Stephen, Fortnightly Review, July 188S. 



A set of facts have been recently brought to my attention which I 

 hardly know how to treat, so I say a word about them in this footnote. I 

 refer to a type of experience which has frequently found a place amongst 

 the 'Yes' answers to the ' Census of Hallucinations,' and which is gener- 

 ally described by those who report it as an ' impression of the presence ' of 

 someone near them, although no sensation either of sight, hearing, or touch 

 is involved. From the way in which this experience is spoken of by those 

 who have had it, it would appear to be an extremely definite and positive 

 state of mind, coupled with a belief in the reality of its object quite as 

 strong as any direct sensation ever gives. And yet 7io sensation seems to 

 be connected with it at all. Sometimes the person whose nearness is thus 

 impressed is a known person, dead or living, sometimes an unknown one. 

 His attitude and situation are often very definitely impressed, and so, some- 

 times (though not by way of hearing), are words which he wishes to say. 



The phenomenon would seem to be due to a pure conception becoming 



