364 PSYCHOLOGY. 



same reason that soap-suds or whipped eggs are white" — 

 in other words, instead of giving the reason for a fact, we 

 give another example of the same fact. This ofieriug a simi- 

 lar instance, instead of a reason, has often been criticised 

 as one of the forms of logical depravity in men. But mani- 

 festly it is not a perverse act of thought, but only an in- 

 complete one. Furnishing parallel cases is the necessary 

 tirst step towards abstracting the reason imbedded in 

 them all. 



A.S it is with reasons, so it is with words. The first 

 words are probably always names of entire things and en- 

 tire actions, of extensive coherent groups. A new exjoeri- 

 ence in the primitive man can only be talked about by 

 him in terms of the old experiences which have received 

 names. It reminds him of certain ones from among them, 

 but the points in which it agrees with them are neither 

 named nor dissociated. Pure similarity must work before 

 the abstraction can work which is based upon it. The first 

 adjectives will therefore probably be total nouns embody- 

 ing the striking character. The j^i'inieval man will say, 

 not ' the bread is hard,' but ' the bread is stone' ; not 

 * the face is round,' but ' the face is moon' ; not ' the 

 fruit is sweet,' but ' the fruit is sugar-cane.' The first 

 words are thus neither particular nor general, but vaguely 

 concrete ; just as we s|)eak of an ' oval ' face, a ' velvet ' 

 skin, or an ' iron' will, without meaning to connote any 

 other attributes of the adjective-noun than those in which 

 it does resemble the noun it is used to qualif3^ After 

 a while certain of these adjectively-used nouns come only 

 to signify the particular quality for wdiose sake they are 

 oftenest used ; the entire thing which they originally meant 

 receives another name, and they become true abstract 

 and general terms. Oval, for example, with us suggests 

 only shape. The first abstract qualities thus formed are, 

 no doubt, qualities of one and the same sense found in 

 different objects — as big, sweet ; next analogies between 

 different senses, as ' sharp ' of taste, ' high ' of sound, etc. ; 

 then analogies of motor combinations, or form ot relation, 

 as simple, confused, difficult, reciprocal, relative, spontane- 

 ous, etc. The extreme degree of subtlety in analogy is 



