390 PSYCHOLOGY. 



really tolerably plain. Man has a far greater variety of 

 impulses than any lower animal ; and any one of these im- 

 pulses, taken in itself, is as ' blind ' as the lowest instinct 

 can be ; but, owing to man's memory, power of reflection, 

 and power of inference, they come each one to be felt by 

 him, after he has once yielded to them and experienced 

 their results, in connection with ?i foresight of those results. 

 In this condition an impulse acted out may be said to be 

 acted out, in part at least, for the sake of its results. It is 

 obvious that every instinctive act, in an animal luith memory, 

 mnst cease to he ' blind ' after being once repeated., and must be 

 accompanied with foresight of its ' end ' just so far as that 

 end may have fallen under the animal's cognizance. An 

 insect that lays her eggs in a place where she never sees 

 them hatched must always do so ' blindly ; ' but a hen who has 

 already hatched a brood can hardly be assumed to sit with 

 perfect ' blindness ' on her second nest. Some expectation 

 of consequences must in every case like this be aroused ; 

 and this expectation, according as it is that of something 

 desired or of something disliked, must necessarily either 

 re-enforce or inhibit the mere impulse. The hen's idea of 

 the chickens would probably encourage her to sit ; a rat's 

 memory, on the other hand, of a former escape from a trap 

 would neutralize his impulse to take bait from anything 

 that reminded him of that trap. If a boy sees a fat hop- 

 ping-toad, he probably has incontinently an impulse (espe- 

 cially if with other boys) to smash the creature with a stone, 

 which impulse we may suppose him blindly to obey. But 

 something in the expression of the dying toad's clasped 

 hands suggests the meanness of the act, or reminds him of 

 sayings he has heard about the sufi^erings of animals being 

 like his own ; so that, when next he is tempted by a toad, 

 an idea arises which, far from spurring him again to the 

 torment, prompts kindly actions, and may even make him 

 the toad's champion against less reflecting boys. 



It is plain, then, that, no matter how ivell endowed an animal 

 may originally be in the loay of instincts, his resultant actions 

 luill be much modified if the instincts combine with experiencCy 

 if in addition to impulses he have memories, associations, 

 inferences, and expectations, on any considerable scale. An 



