WILL. 525 



which paralyzed our activity then and kept our idea of ris- 

 ing in the condition of ivish and not of ivill. The moment 

 these inhibitory ideas ceased, the original idea exerted its 

 effects. 



This case seems to me to contain in miniature form the 

 data for an entire psychology of volition. It was in fact 

 through meditating on the phenomenon in my own person 

 that I first became convinced of the truth of the doctrine 

 which these pages present, and which I need here illustrate 

 by no farther examples.* The reason why that doctrine is 

 not a self-evident truth is that we have so many ideas 

 which do not result in action. But it will be seen that in 

 every such case, without exception, that is because other 

 ideas simultaneously present rob them of their impulsive 

 power. But even here, and when a movement is inJiibited 

 from completely taking place by contrary ideas, it will in- 

 cipiently take place. To quote Lotze once more : 



"The spectator accompanies the throwing of a billiard-ball, or the 

 thrust of the swordsman, with slight movements of his arm; the un- 

 taught narrator tells his story with many gesticulations; the reader 

 while absorbed in the perusal of a battle-scene feels a slight tension run 

 through his muscular system, keeping time as it were with the actions 

 he is reading of. These results become the more marked the more we 

 are absorbed in thinking of the movements which suggest them; they 

 grow fainter exactly in proportion as a complex consciousness, under 

 the dominion of a crowd of other representations, withstands the pass- 

 ing over of mental contemplation into outward action." 



The 'willing-game,' the exhibitions of so-called 'mind- 

 reading,' or more properly muscle-reading, which have late- 

 ly grown so fashionable, are based on this incipient obe- 

 dience of muscular contraction to idea, even when the 

 deliberate intention is that no contraction shall occur.f 



* Professor A. Bain (Senses and Intellect, pp 336-48) and Dr. "W. B. 

 Carpenter (Mental Physiology, chap, vi) give examples in abundance. 



f For a full account, by an expert, of the 'willing-game,' .see Mr. 

 Stuart Cumberland's article: A Thought-reader's Experiences in the Nine- 

 teenth century, xx. 867. M. Gley has given a good example of ideo- 

 motor action in the Bulletins de la Societe de Psychologic Physiologique 

 for 1889. Tell a person to think intently of a certain name, and saying 

 that you will then force her to write it, let her hold a pencil, and do you 

 yourself hold her hand. She will then probably trace the name involun- 

 tarily, believing that you are forcing her to do it. 



