WILL. 529 



foreground, aud at another moment other parts, in conse- 

 quence of the oscillations of our attention, and of the ' asso- 

 ciative ' flow of our ideas. But no matter how sharp the 

 foreground-reasons may be, or how imminently close to 

 bursting through the dam and carrying the motor conse- 

 quences their own way, the background, however dimly felt, 

 is always there ; and its presence (so long as the indecision 

 actually lasts) serves as an effective check upon the irrevo- 

 cable discharge. The deliberation may last for weeks or 

 months, occupying at intervals the mind. The motives 

 which yesterday seemed full of urgency and blood and life 

 to-day feel strangely weak aud pale and dead. But as little 

 to-day as to-morrow is the question finally resolved. Some- 

 thing tells us that all this is provisional ; that the weakened 

 reasons will wax strong again, and the stronger weaken ; 

 that equilibrium is unreached ; that testing our reasons, not 

 obeying them, is still the order of the day, and that we 

 must wait awhile, patient or impatiently, until our mind 

 is made up 'for good and all.' This inclining, first to one 

 then to another future, both of which we represent as pos- 

 sible, resembles the oscillations to and fro of a material 

 body within the limits of its elasticity. There is inward 

 strain, but no outward rupture. And this condition, 

 plainly enough, is susceptible of indefinite continuance, as 

 well in the physical mass as in the mind. If the elasticity 

 give way, however, if the dam ever do break, and the cur- 

 rents burst the crust, vacillation is over and decision is 

 irrevocably there. 



The decision may come in any one of many modes. I 

 will try briefly to sketch the most characteristic types of it, 

 merely warning the reader that this is only an introspective 

 account of symptoms and phenomena, and that all ques- 

 tions of causal agency, whether neural or spiritual, are rele- 

 gated to a later page. 



The particular reasons for or against action are of course 

 infinitely various in concrete cases. But certain motives 

 are more or less constantly in play. One of these is im- 

 patience of the deliberative state; or to express it otherwise, 

 proneness to act or to decide merely because action and 



