WILL. 636 



effort is more frequent than it is, by the fact that during 

 deliberation we so often have a feeling of how great an effort 

 it would take to make a decision noiv. Later, after the de- 

 cision has made itself with ease, we recollect this and 

 erroneously supjjose the effort also to have been made then. 

 The existence of the effort as a phenomenal fact in our 

 consciousness cannot of course be doubted or denied. Its 

 significance, on the other hand, is a matter about which the 

 gravest difference of opinion prevails. Questions as mo- 

 mentous as that of the very existence of spiritual causality, 

 as vast as that of universal predestination or free-will, de- 

 pend on its interpretation. It therefore becomes essential 

 that we study with some care the conditions under which 

 the feeling of volitional effort is found. 



THE FEELING OF EFFOKT. 



When, awhile back (p. 526), I said that consciousness (or 

 the neural process which goes with it) is in its very nature 

 impulsive, I added in a note the proviso that it must he 

 sufficiently intense. Now there are remarkable differences 

 in the power of different sorts of consciousness to excite 

 movement. The intensity of some feelings is practically 

 apt to be below the discharging point, whilst that of others 

 is apt to be above it. By practically ajDt, I mean apt under 

 ordinary circumstances. These circumstances may be 

 habitual inhibitions, like that comfortable feeling of the 

 dolcefar niente which gives to each and all of us a certain 

 dose of laziness only to be overcome by the acuteness of 

 the impulsive spur ; or they may consist in the native 

 inertia, or internal resistance, of the motor centres them- 

 selves making explosion impossible until a certain inward 

 tension has been reached and overpast. These conditions 

 may vary from one person to another and in the same per- 

 son from time to time. The neural inertia may wax or wane, 

 and the habitual inhibitions dwindle or augment. The in- 

 tensity of particular thought-processes and stimulations 

 may also change independently, and particular paths of 

 association grow more pervious or less so. There thus re- 

 sult great possibilities of alteration in the actual impui- 



