558 PSYCHOLOGY. 



well through with it," that thought also having its impulsive 

 spur. But because a pleasure of achievement can thus be- 

 come a pursued pleasure upon occasion, it does not follow 

 that everywhere and always that pleasure must be what is 

 pursued. This, however, is what the pleasure-philosophers 

 seem to suppose. As well might they suppose, because uo 

 steamer can go to sea without incidentally consuming coal, 

 and because some steamers may occasionally go to sea to 

 try their coal, that therefore no steamer can go to sea for 

 any other motive than that of coal-consumption.* 



As we need not act for the sake of gaining the pleasure of 

 achievement, so neither need we act for the sake of escaping 

 the uneasiness of arrest. This uneasiness is altogether due 

 to the fact that the act is already tending to occur on other 

 grounds. And these original grounds are what impel to its 

 continuance, even though the uneasiness of the arrest may 

 upon occasion add to their impulsive power. 



To conclude, I am far from denjing the exceeding prom- 

 inence and importance of the part which pleasures and 

 pains, both felt and represented, play in the motivation of 

 our conduct. But I must insist that it is no exclusive part, 

 and that co-ordinately with these mental objects innumer- 

 able others liave an exactly similar impulsive and inhibitive 

 power, f 



If one must have a single name for the condition upon 

 which the impulsive and inhibitive quality of objects de- 

 pends, one had better call it their interest. ' The interest- 



* How much clearer Hume's head was than that of his disciples' ! "It 

 has been proved beyond all controversj^ that even the passions commonly 

 esteemed selfish carry the Mind beyond self directly to the object ; that 

 though the satisfaction of these passions gives us enjoyment, yet the pros- 

 pect of this enjoyment is not the cause of the passions but, on the contrary, 

 the passion is antecedent to the enjoyment, and without the former the latter 

 could never possibly exist," etc. (Essay on the Ditf erent Species of Philoso 

 phy, § 1, note near the end.) 



•f- In favor of the view in the text, one may consult H. Sidgwick, Meth 

 ods of Ethics, book i. chap, iv; T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, bk. 

 ni. chap. I. p. 179; Carpenter, Mental Physiol., chap vi ; J. Martineau, 

 Types of Ethical Theory, part ii, bk. i, chap. ii. i, and bk. ii, branch i. 

 chap. I. i. g 3. Against it see Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, chap. ii. 

 § II ; H. Spencer. Data of Ethics, §§ 9-15; D. G. Thompson, System of 

 Psychology, part ix, and Mind, vi. 62. Also Bain, Senses and Intellect, 

 '?3&-44 , Emotions and Will. 436. 



