568 PSYCHOLOGY. 



extra-mental matter (as many pliilosopliers still maintain), 

 but between our Self and our own states of mind. But 

 when, a short while ago, I spoke of the filling of the mind 

 with an idea as being equivalent to consent to the idea's 

 object, I said something which the reader doubtless ques- 

 tioned at the time, and which certainl}^ now demands some 

 qualification ere we pass beyond. 



It is unqualifiedly true that if any thought do fill the 

 mind exclusively, such filling is consent. The thought, for 

 that time at any rate, carries the man and his will with it. 

 But it is not true that the thought need fill the mind ex- 

 clusively for consent to be there ; for we often consent to 

 things whilst thinking of other things, even of hostile 

 things ; and we saw in fact that precisely what distinguishes 

 our ' fifth type ' of decision from the other types (see p. 534) 

 is just this coexistence with the triumphant thought of 

 other thoughts which would inhibit it but for the effort 

 which makes it prevail. The effort to attend is therefore 

 only a part of what the word ' will ' covers ; it covers also 

 the effort to consent to something to which our attention is 

 not quite complete. Often, when an object has gained our 

 attention exclusively, and its motor results are just on the 

 point of setting in, it seems as if the sense of their immi- 

 nent irrevocability were enough of itself to start up the in- 

 hibitory ideas and to make us pause. Then we need a new 

 stroke of effort to break down the sudden hesitation which 

 seizes upo:a us, and to persevere. So that although atten- 

 tion is the first and fundamental thing in volition, express 

 consent to the reality of luhat is attended to is often an ad- 

 ditional and quite distinct plienomenon involved. 



The reader's own consciousness tells him of course just 

 what these words of mine denote. And I freely confess 

 that I am impotent to carry the analysis of the matter any 

 farther, or to explain in other terms of what this consent 

 consists. It seems a subjective experience sui generis, which 

 we can designate but not define. We stand here exactly 

 where we did in the case of belief. When an idea stings us 

 in a certain way, makes as it were a certain electric connec- 

 tion with our self, we believe that it is a reality. When it 

 stings us in another way, makes another connection with 



