WILL. 571 



immaiterial process alongside of the material processes of the 

 world. It is certain, however, that only by postdating such 

 thinking do we make things currently intelligible ; and it is 

 certain that no psychologist has as yet denied the fact of 

 thinking, the utmost that has been denied being its dynamic 

 power. But if we postulate the fact of the thinking at all, 

 I believe that we must postulate its power as well ; nor do 

 I see how we can rightly equalize its power with its mere 

 existence, and say (as M. Fouillee seems to say) that for the 

 thought-process to go on at all is an activity, and an activity 

 everywhere the same ; for certain steps forward in this 

 process seem prima facie to be passive, and other steps, 

 (as where an object comes with effort) seem prima facie to 

 be active in a supreme degree. If we admit, therefore, that 

 our thoughts exist, we ought to admit that they exist after 

 the fashion in which they appear, as things, namely, that 

 supervene upon each other, sometimes with effort and some- 

 times with ease ; the only questions being, is the effort 

 where it exists a fixed function of the object, which the latter 

 imposes on the thought? or is it such an independent 

 'variable' that with a constant object more or less of it 

 may be made ? 



It certainly aj)pears to us indeterminate, and as if, even 

 with an unchanging object, we might make more or less, as 

 we choose. If it be really indeterminate, our future acts are 

 ambiguous or unpredestinate : in common parlance, our 

 wills are free. If the amount of effort be not indeterminate, 

 but be related in a fixed manner to the objects themselves, 

 in such wise that whatever object at any time fills our 

 consciousness was from eternity bound to fill it then and 

 there, and compel from us the exact effort, neither more nor 

 less, which we bestow upon it, — then our wills are not free, 

 and all our acts are foreordained. The question of fact in 

 the free-will controversy is thus extremely sirnple. It relates 

 solely to the amount of eftbrt of attention or consent which 

 we can at any time put forth. Are the duration and intensity 

 of this effort fixed, functions of the object, or are they not ? 

 Now, as I just said, it seems as if the eftbrt were an inde- 

 pendent variable, as if we might exert more or less of it in 

 any given case. When a man has let his thoughts go for 



