NECESSARY TRUTHS-EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 665 



for all possible experience. They are primarily interesting 

 only as subjective facts. They stand waiting in the mind, 

 forming a beautiful ideal network ; and the most we can 

 say is that Ave liope. to discover outer realities over which the 

 network may be flung so that ideal and real may coincide. 



And this brings us back to ' science ' from which we di- 

 verted our attention so long ago (see p. 64.0). Science thinks 

 that she has discovered the outer realities in question. 

 Atoms and ether, with no properties but masses and veloc- 

 ities expressible by numbers, and paths expressible by an- 

 alytic formulas, these at last are things over which the 

 mathematico-logical network may be flung, and by suj)pos- 

 ing which instead of sensible phenomena science becomes 

 yearly more able to manufacture for herself a world about 

 which rational propositions may be framed. Sensible phe- 

 nomena are pure delusions for the mechanical philosophy. 

 The ' things ' and qualities we instinctively believe in do 

 not exist. The only realities are swarming solids in ever* 

 lasting motion, undulatory or continued, whose expression- 

 less and meaningless changes of position form the history 

 of the Avorld, and are deducible from initial collocations 

 and habits of movement liypothetically assumed. Thous- 

 ands of years ago men started to cast the chaos of nature's 

 sequences and juxtapositions into a form that might seem 

 intelligible. Many Avere their ideal prototypes of rational 

 order : teleological and aesthetic ties betAveen things, causal 

 and substantial bonds, as well as logical and mathematical 

 relations. The most promising of these ideal systems at first 

 were of course the richer ones, the sentimental ones. The 

 baldest and least promising Avere the mathematical ones; but 

 the histor}' of the latter's application is a history of steadily 

 advancing successes, Avhilst that of the sentimentally richer 



be the results of experience would be such as experience violated. The 

 first thing a Kantian ought to do is to discover forms of judgment to which 

 no order in ' things ' runs panillel. These would indeed be features native 

 to ihe mind. 1 owe this remark to Herr A. Spir, in whose 'Denken und 

 Wirklichkeit ' it is somewhere contained. I have myself already to some 

 extent proceeded, and in the pages which follow shall proceed still farther, 

 to show the originality of the mind's structure in this way. 



