178 Science Religion and Reality 



free will at all ; and we never reach a stage of development when 

 we can say that our consciousness is willed by us. The formula 

 " I am that which I will," which Blondel takes from Secretan, is 

 an expression without meaning ; the will supposes a determinate 

 psychological structure which, just because it is presupposed by 

 the will, cannot be considered as created by it. 



Further, even by adopting the point of view of Blondel and 

 conceding to him that the final completion which the Ego needs 

 exists, why shall we have to limit ourselves to making the experi- 

 ment of the practice of the Christian religion and not that of the 

 other religions ? In order to decide which satisfies best, we should 

 have to put them all to the test. The Buddhist believer is not less 

 satisfied than the Christian believer. Who will assure us that this 

 state of satisfaction is not a purely subjective phenomenon depend- 

 ing on certain habits already contracted ? The satisfaction is 

 relative to the needs of the particular individual, and the needs 

 in their turn depend on education, habits, etc. How can it be 

 assumed outright from the index of a supernatural intervention ? 

 Very many individuals, moreover, are equally satisfied, or at least 

 believe themselves to be so, without any practical religion. Who 

 tells us that our satisfaction is superior to theirs ? The method of 

 immanence adopted by Blondel will enable us to assert that there 

 exists in the soul a state of satisfaction ; but whether this satisfac- 

 tion is brought about by natural causes, or whether it depends on 

 supernatural intervention, cannot be decided. In order to dis- 

 tinguish God from my subjective feelings, in order to consider Him 

 as transcendent — that is, as real even outside my subjective experi- 

 ence (and Blondel says that he wishes to recognise Him as such) — 

 I cannot do less than turn to an opinion of intellectual character 

 in which existence is placed independently of the two terms ; that 

 is to say, of my state of satisfaction and of the supernatural which 

 gives it to me. Logical reflection alone will be able to decide 

 whether the satisfaction is due to natural causes or to the action of a 

 supernatural principle. 



It might be remarked to Le Roy that dogma could not serve 

 as a rule of practical conduct unless it has a theoretical content ; 

 and even the manner of acting varies in relation to this content. 

 Thus, in order to act towards God as towards a person one must 

 have a concept, however vague, of this personality, and just as the 

 manner of acting varies according to the persons with whom one 



