i8o Science Religion and Reality 



itself believe, must be brought to it by logical reflection ; and if no 

 logical reflection finds arguments to decide it, it is clear, in a con- 

 trary sense, that it will not lead itself to accept that belief. Religious 

 intuitionism parts from the false concepts of a liberated will above 

 the sentiment and the reason and capable of dominating them at 

 will, while the will in reality does not subsist except in so far as 

 there are certain motives, either sentimental or logical, which 

 determine it : a will without motives is a psychological absurdity. 

 But, it could be objected, there are cases in which, from the point 

 of view of theoretical reasons, we find ourselves faced with two 

 equally probable hypotheses. The will ^yill then, say Renouvier, 

 OUe-Laprune, and James, be able to weigh the scales down on the 

 side which corresponds to the exigencies of moral life. We reply 

 that a philosophical hypothesis, in order to be acceptable from the 

 rational point of view, must take into account all the facts, and 

 therefore the moral feelings and the law of beauty also as it is 

 experimented with in consciousness. Of two hypotheses, there- 

 fore, one of which takes count of the moral life and the other does 

 not, we must choose the first by that same methodical principle by 

 which we put on one side a physical theory if there is even one fact 

 which is contrary to it. But it is clear that the hypothesis harmonis- 

 ing with moral facts is not here chosen by an arbitrary exercise of 

 the will, but because it is the most satisfactory from the rational 

 point of view. If the religious hypothesis, therefore, presents itself 

 as the only one which explains all the facts of experience, including 

 the moral life, it will be justified from the logical point of 

 view, and we shall have not only a moral certainty of it, but also a 

 theoretical and rational one ; and we shall not be authorised 

 thereby, with irrationalism, to place above the intellect a higher 

 source of inspiration and of certainty. 



The foregoing discussion has brought out the fact that the 

 intellectual element is an integral part of religion. If we try to 

 eliminate it, there remains only the nebula of emotion, in which 

 we are able to recognise not only no positive, determinate religion, 

 but not even any religion in its more generic form. Further, the 

 moral conscience which the Pragmatists wish to make the organ of 

 piety has a universal character and overflows the circle of individual 

 subjectivity in so far as it contains within itself rational elements. 

 It is a false way of understanding the spiritual life, to claim to 

 divide the soul into various compartments, in one of which, for 



