196 Science Religion and Reality 



analysis may be a passing phase in the physical conception of the 

 external world. It has happened that up to now we have chiefly 

 studied phenomena which are best unravelled by starting with their 

 minutest elements. But in recent years there has come into 

 prominence a large class of phenomena (quantum phenomena) 

 which defy analysis of this kind ; and somewhat painfully, physics 

 is accustoming itself to the idea that its microscopic picture of 

 nature is not capable of containing the conceptions which these 

 latest phenomena require. 



It is often said that the purpose of scientific theories is to pro- 

 vide a conception of the world which " economises thought," and 

 that they do not profess to represent the reality which actually 

 exists — the latter aim being considered unattainable. We disagree 

 with the first part of this dictum at any rate. In our view the 

 external world about which the scientific theory attempts to assert 

 something, is capable of precise definition along the lines already 

 indicated — namely, that it is the common element abstracted 

 from the experiences of individuals in all variety of physical cir- 

 cumstances ; and any assertion about it (if it is unambiguous) must 

 be right or wrong — not merely economical or wasteful. Whilst 

 a direct statement about this external world is naturally preferable to 

 a circumlocutory statement, the test of truth of the statement has 

 nothing to do with economy of thought. Science is not describing 

 a world invented to save trouble ; it is following up a problem 

 which took definite shape the first time two human beings com- 

 pared notes of their experiences ; and it follows it up according to 

 the original rules — namely, to obtain the element common to all 

 human experience separated from the merely individual elements 

 in that experience. If we say of anything in this external world 

 that it is real or that it exists, we are merely expressing our belief 

 that the rules have been properly followed — that it is not an 

 hallucination belonging only to one individual experience, or a 

 mistaken concept due to an error in the process of synthesis. Many 

 philosophers seem to consider that the statement that the external 

 world is real, adds some property to it not comprised in the state- 

 ment that it is the part of our experience held in common, but I am 

 not aware that anyone has made a suggestion as to what this 

 property could be. I simply do not contemplate the awful con- 

 tingency that the external world of physics, after all our care in 

 arriving at it, might be disqualified by failing to "exist," because 



