Mechanistic Biology 253 



Matter there lies the Ground of Physical Phenomena of Nature in 

 general and of Animals. The Foundation of the Regular Forma- 

 tion of Animal Bodies has its Origin in the actual Nature of 

 Living Matter. The Forces of the Human Body are also Pro- 

 perties of its Matter and its Special Forces result from the special 

 characteristics of its Matter." 



If now we substitute for Reil's word " Form " the term 

 " Colloidal state " we see how nearly he came to the present view. 

 But he went further, and his guess came even more miraculously 

 near the conclusions of modern biochemistry, for he thus defined 

 the word " Form " : " The Form of Matter is a Result of the 

 Manner of the Aggregation of its Constituents." It is possible 

 that he meant the structure and disposition of organs rather than 

 any more intimate molecular arrangement. But even if so, he 

 was not on the wrong line ; he simply failed to go far enough, 

 since it is the molecular structure and not the morphological 

 structure which is here in question. There can be no doubt that 

 mechanistic biology is quite capable of describing physical life, as 

 far as anything can be described by the scienti fie method. Bergson's 

 opinions on the mind-body problem fall well into line with these 

 views. He speaks of the brain as the " organ of the insertion of 

 the mind into things," and uses Descartes' own words in saying 

 that " the body is utilised for the ends of the mind." 



But if we adopt this view, that living matter is the result of the 

 impact of mind into the world of mechanics, we shall not be able 

 to go the whole way with Descartes. For he would have said that 

 nothing was produced by that impact, rather bodies acting mechani- 

 cally were produced by necessity in the world of mechanics and into 

 one type of them and one only " God breathed a living soul." 

 Descartes was led to this position by various now obsolete arguments 

 of a psychological nature which tended to show that no conscious- 

 ness could be attributed to any animal except man. Comparative 

 psychology of the present day would not admit his conclusions for a 

 moment : so our conception, though owing a great deal to his, is 

 necessarily much broader. For although all living organisms are 

 to be considered as physico-chemical systems, yet at the same time 

 they are, as it were, musical instruments, the keys of which are in 

 all cases played by something however meagre in mental develop- 

 ment it may be. This form of animism is in every way compatible 

 with physico-chemical research, for although nobody denies that 



