276 Science Religion and Reality 



of a particular biped, like, for example, a smooth skin. And this 

 again is a metaphysical question not to be evaded by turning a 

 convenient abstraction from mind into bad metaphysics. 



(2) Of the type akin to Schleiermacher's theory, the best-knovi^n 

 is Feuerbach's, v^^hich not only resembles Schleiermacher's view 

 of religion, but was in fact based on it. Religion is for Feuerbach 

 illusion caused by feeling. Feeling in this case has no longer any 

 relation to reality, but is pure wandering desire. Man's gods are 

 the mere emotional reflexion of what he himself would like to be, 

 the mere projection of desire by fantasy. 



Once again it is plain that the essential religious part is the 

 objective reference, and that the ground on which reality is denied 

 to it is not any kind of psychology. So far as psychology goes, 

 there is no reason why the "infinity, perfection, might, holiness we 

 seek in ourselves and have not " should not have a reality corre- 

 sponding to them. The true ground for the denial is empiricism, 

 the denial of any kind of knowledge except what comes through 

 the senses or is inferred from their data. The professed rejection 

 of metaphysics does not alter the fact that this is merely a very 

 questionable metaphysical conclusion. Moreover, it is a conclu- 

 sion which turns a great deal more than religion into illusion, for, 

 if desire of every kind is, as Feuerbach maintains, pure egoism 

 which stains our whole life so that it becomes a desolating 

 hypocrisy, can we rely even upon our senses, seeing that the use 

 of them also depends upon our interests ? The observed pheno- 

 mena of the senses do not enter our minds as water by a pipe into 

 a cistern, but become conscious knowledge as we think them ; 

 and we think them as they are of value for us. 



(3} The more recent theories of religion as illusion are mostly 

 of the Kantian type. All of them profess to settle the matter on 

 psychological grounds alone, but all of them, once more, make it 

 plain that religion is a reference to an external environment, and 

 that this reference remains characteristic of religion whether the 

 environment be real or imaginary. 



Of this type there are two distinct forms, one ascribing religion 

 mainly to the struggle for survival, and the other to the require- 

 ments of society, but both making it essentially an affair of will. 



Leuba's theory we may take as an example of the first type. 

 As with Kant, the central place in the creation of experience is 

 given to will, though the reason for it is different, being determined 



