278 Science Religion and Reality 



to the level of knowledge of reality, must run an effectively 

 parallel course with it. But if a vast illusion about it prove to 

 be the most effective way of dealing with our environment, even 

 this confidence is baseless. 



Apart from this idea of the unreality of its reference, Leuba's 

 theory of religion is not very different from Ritschl's view that the 

 beginning of religion is a distinction in value between personal 

 beings and extended things, and that its concern is to secure this 

 worth in face of the mechanical forces of nature or society, or, in 

 other words, that it is essentially personal victory over the mechanical 

 world. And it is certainly not any kind of psychological argument 

 which would prevent us from concluding with Ritschl that, if this 

 victory is possible, it can only be because there is a reality in the 

 world and above it akin to the personal. 



The second form of this theory of religion as an illusion of the 

 will ascribes religion to man's social consciousness. Leuba also 

 adds that the ideals of the community are unified, socialised, con- 

 solidated by being embodied in gods. This is, however, only a 

 slight extension of his theory, for society is considered by him 

 mainly for its value as support in the struggle for survival. But 

 the French anthropological school of which Durkheim is the best- 

 known representative, makes the authority of the social group 

 itself the source of all religion. 



Religion, Durkheim says, has been too enduring and domin- 

 ating a factor in human history to be regarded as a mere mental 

 illusion. Some objective reality, he thinks, it must have. This 

 he finds in the sanction of the social group. The authority of 

 the group is what makes anything sacred, and so distinguishes its 

 sanction from all other sanctions of various degrees of force. 



But, first of all, a social sanction is not the kind of sanction 

 which religion itself claims, and in point of fact a social sanction is 

 not by itself more sacred than a personal one, nor is it recognised, 

 at least by any advanced religion, as being so. This theory, there- 

 fore, would seem to reduce religion to illusion quite as much as 

 Leuba's. 



It also quite as definitely raises the question why such an 

 illusion should have wrought so long and so effectively. If there 

 is actually a sacred world and man belongs to it, human relations 

 may be sacred and sacred obligation be the pillar and ground of 

 them ; but if society is merely an extension of the herd instinct, the 



