The Sphere of Religion 279 



idea that its relations are sacred is an illusion, the rise of which is 

 difficult to explain and the obligation of which all progress in 

 understanding must undermine. 



The recognition of the sacred as the religious element is 

 important, but it is precisely this sacredness which is, on the theory, 

 illusion. And the question is how such an illusion could arise out 

 of mere mass feeling, and still more, how it could later develop into 

 the only sanction which could be set up effectively against the mass 

 mind. If the sense of the sacred were already there, it would 

 naturally attach itself to the society in which we live and by which 

 we live ; but how, out of mere social, variable, and comparative 

 values, could the idea of an absolute value, in the might of which 

 man can stand alone over against his whole society, ever arise ? 

 Nothing is more certain than that the sacred claims to have its 

 sanction in itself and to be corrupted when it is accepted as 

 submission to public opinion. 



All these theories, therefore, direct attention away from merely 

 psychological marks of religion. Quite as clearly, by regarding 

 it as illusion as by regarding it as the ultimate reality, they show 

 that the essential quality of religion is the claim to deal with a special 

 kind of environment, which has its own particular sanctions. If 

 this environment do not exist, religion has no basis. And, even so, 

 it would not be a mere psychological state to be described as illusion, 

 but would be a wrong objective reference, due to misunderstanding, 

 not about our own minds, but about our environment, so that it 

 ought rather to be described as delusion. Wherefore, any theory 

 of religion as illusion also brings us back to the view of religion as 

 essentially a dealing with an unseen environment of absolute worth 

 which demands worship. If this environment were proved to 

 be non-existent, religion would be shown to be baseless, but its 

 essential character would still depend on this supposed objective 

 reference and not on some peculiar quality of belief, or pious feeling, 

 or practical trust. And, as it is the same human nature which deals 

 with all environment, if the environment do not exist, we should 

 the less expect anything peculiar in man's way of dealing with it, 

 because, while every real higher environment stirs higher faculties 

 and affords larger opportunities for displaying them, an imaginary 

 one cannot be the source of such a development as the sense of the 

 sacred. 



