378 Science Religion and Reality 



But Schleiermacher's plea for the trustworthiness of the emotions 

 cannot be so summarily dismissed. The hfe of devotion does carry 

 its own evidence with it. We must only demur to its being called 

 pure feeling. There is nothing intrinsically good or bad about 

 feeling. Flowers and weeds bloom there side by side. We cannot 

 even speak of truth of feeling, unless we extend feeling to include 

 the formation of ideas, I do not think religious feeling is ever 

 aroused, except by ideas of objective truth and value -, but these 

 ideas are certainly not generated by feeling. 



It is not to be denied that the stimulation of violent emotions 

 may leave permanent traces on the mind. This was doubtless 

 discovered empirically, and orgiastic worship was practised with 

 this end. The undifferentiated, inchoate religious sense is thus 

 intensified and fixed, to the great and lasting injury of the spiritual 

 life. The fruits of emotional revivalism, if they are permanent, 

 are chiefly bad. 



This is, perhaps, the best place to mention the concept of" the 

 Holy," which since Otto's famous book has been given a new 

 importance in English books on the psychology of religion. The 

 idea of holiness has its history, like other religious ideas, and the 

 history is not edifying. The holiness of Jehovah, as exemplified 

 by the death of Uzzah for touching the ark, was much more like 

 electricity than any moral quality. The whole history of taboo 

 might be introduced here. But Otto is right in emphasising the 

 feeling of awe, dread, and fascination as an essential part of religion. 

 It is generally mixed with superstitious elements, and should never 

 be the dominating feeling in the approach of the Christian to his 

 Father in heaven. " He that feareth is not made perfect in love." 

 The impression made by Otto's book may lead to this feature being 

 somewhat over-emphasised. 



Another school, which is well represented in our day, makes 

 faith an affair of the will. It is pointed out that people in general 

 are not convinced by pure reasoning, but that they believe what 

 they wish to believe. Hobbes declared that even the axioms of 

 Euclid would be disputed if men's passions were concerned in them. 

 But the question is not whether men do actually form their opinions 

 in this way, but whether they ought to do so ; and the answer to 

 this question depends on whether we have any confidence in human 

 reason or not. The primacy of the will over the intellect goes with 

 sceptical empiricism. It is the root of the philosophy called 



