at the time of alert. The special SPODs and APODs would be providing 
both intra-theater and inter-theater logistic throughput by accepting 
various surface support craft along with large cargo transport ships and 
aircraft. These elements of sealift and airlift would be transiting 
between the CONUS, the nearest remaining U.S. forward land bases and, 
the special APODS and SPODS established in-theater. 
Although, the MAGTFs are capable of sustained operations of extend- 
ed duration, U.S. strategy requires that such forces be maintained in a 
state of standby readiness whenever not actually engaged in an immediate 
crisis response. Hence, for the extended duration of the insurgency as 
depicted in the crisis scenario, the MAGTFs would be replaced by up to 
two Army mechanized light infantry divisions deployed in accordance with 
1986 Rapid Deployment Force planning. However, the MAGTFs would be 
required to maintain the operation pending airlift of the Army Rapid 
Deployment Forces from CONUS to the battle zone. Moreover, the heavy 
combat equipment would necessarily be transported either by sealift or 
transport aircraft capable of accommodating outsize cargo. 
24 
