BASING SYSTEM I (MOBS) 
U.S. Strategy: This is the year 2005. Over the past decade the 
U.S. has been implementing its strategy of "Discriminate Deterrence" by 
deploying modularized ocean basing system (MOBS) platforms at selected 
locations in lieu of diminished access to fixed land bases. This re- 
ordering of the the U.S forward basing network is still in process. 
Changes in the economic status of Third World nations has adversely 
impacted the effectiveness of some vital U.S. foreign bases. This has 
resulted in diminished utility and increased access costs. 
As a consequence of these developments, the U.S. has deployed MOBS 
outside the EEZ of host countries as a reliable alternative to land 
bases. In the interest of harmonious foreign relations, MOBS deploy- 
ments conform to provisions of the Third United Nations Conference on 
Law of the Sea, 1982, as well as special treaty relationships with 
concerned sovereign states. 
U.S. defense strategists view the deployability of MOBS as compen- 
sation for diminished flexibility caused by restricted access to foreign 
land bases and arbitrary denial of overflight rights. 
Crisis Scene: A major Third World crisis has now emerged involving 
Soviet inspired and supported insurrection in one of the Southwest Asia 
countries. If the insurgents are allowed to prevail, Soviet influence 
will dominate the Persian Gulf theater. The Soviet intent is to acquire, 
by surrogate force, political dominance over the oil-rich countries of 
the Persian Gulf, thereby gaining control of the region's petroleum 
resources for Soviet benefit. 
The crisis scene involves the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a country 
lacking sufficient military capability to withstand prolonged conflict 
against sophisticated guerrilla forces trained and supplied by the 
Soviets. Five years prior to onset of the insurrection, the U.S. de- 
ployed a modularized ocean basing system adjacent to the Gulf of Oman at 
the periphery of Pakistan's EEZ within 500 miles of the Strait of 
Hormuz. 
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