(b) We must have militarily effective responses that can 
limit destruction if we are not to invite destruction of what 
we are defending. 
(c) To help deter nuclear attack and to make it safer to 
reduce offensive arms we need strategic defense. To deter or 
respond to conventional aggression we need a capability for 
conventional counter offensive operations deep into enemy 
territory. 
(d) To help protect U.S. interests and allies in the 
Third World, we will need more of a national consensus on both 
means and ends. Our means should include: (among other pro- 
visions) versatile, mobile forces, minimally dependent on 
overseas bases, that can deliver precisely controlled strikes 
against distant military targets. 
(e) The principles above imply change. But, our strat- 
egy also includes many things that will not change: We will 
need forward deployed forces in some critical, threatened 
areas. 
(f) The United States must develop alternatives to over- 
seas bases. 
The Hudson Institute study, "U.S. Global Basing," offered in four 
separate task reports, was sponsored jointly by the Director of Net 
Assessment, OSD, and the Director, Strategic Concepts Development 
Center, the National Defense University. That study, and an ancillary 
article, ("U.S. Overseas Basing System Faces a Difficult Transition," 
published in the Armed Forces Journal International of February 1989), 
both authored by James R. Blaker of the Hudson Institute (Appendix E, 
Items 2 and 3), set forth the following pertinent security environment 
factors bearing on the U.S. forward basing situation: 
(a) Between now (February 1989) and 1994, the United 
States will renegotiate base access agreements with Spain, 
Portugal, Morocco, the Philippines, Kenya, Oman, Greece, and 
Turkey. 
(b) In the late 1970s several interrelated events trans- 
formed the dynamics of U.S. overseas basing. The most obvious 
of these was the shift in U.S. strategy toward the Persian 
Gulf. The collapse of the U.S.-Iran relationship, followed 
shortly by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, stimulated a 
series of policy shifts (in support of Carter Doctrine) that 
committed the U.S. to the direct defense of Western access to 
Persian Gulf oil, ostensibly against the threat of Soviet 
aggression. 
