Observation: As recently as mid-1989, The Association of 
South East Asian Nation's Inter-Parliamentary Organization has 
called for the closure of all foreign military bases as a step 
toward regional neutrality. This is typical of positions now 
being assumed by Third World nations having welcomed the pro- 
tective presence of U.S. military forces in years past since 
WW II. Between the present time and 1994, the United States 
will renegotiate base access agreements with Spain, Portugal, 
Morocco, the Philippines, Kenya, Oman, Greece, and Turkey. 
Moreover, in anticipation of future basing needs for its 
developing nuclear navy, India has indicated claim for access 
to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Currently Diego Garcia 
is a prime prepositioning node within the U.S. basing network 
in the Middle East and Indian Ocean territory. 
Conclusion: The most viable concept for addressing effective 
basing needs in the year 2000 time frame is a large scale 
floating structure with specified ancillary facilities. 
Observation: The RAND Corporation, in its 1984 report, "A 
Comparison of Methods for Improving U.S. Capability to Project 
Ground Forces to Southwest Asia in the 1990s" assesses a range 
of plausible alternatives. RAND's conclusion is: "A Mobile 
Operational Large Island (MOLI) floating airbase is a promis- 
ing prepositioning platform.... Prepositioning on MOLIs could 
out perform any other system we investigate and would avoid 
the risks of land prepositioning." The 1971 NCEL study of 
MOBS, including model tests, supports the above conclusion as 
to the technical viability of large floating bases (Appendix 
C). In referring to "specified ancillary facilities," as 
stated in the conclusion, these are seen to include the Float- 
ing Deployable Waterfront as demonstrated and analyzed in the 
crisis response scenarios (Appendix D and Section 4.2.0). 
Vii 
