The experiment was to be repeated in exactly the same 

 manner at a later date on the same iceberg. The subsequent 

 location and identification of the iceberg would provide 

 "surface truth" for the predictive technique used in this 

 experiment. 



Conclusions 



Due to the failures in the data recording camera the 

 current probe, iceberg relocation, dye patch identification, 

 and personnel, it is not possible to properly evaluate the 

 expendable surface current probe for determination of iceberg 

 drift from these experiments. However, some worthwhile 

 observations can be made. 



The experiment on 14 and 15 May 1973 showed that "in 

 flight" identification of floats was possible. The observed 

 surface current direction and the INS-indicated iceberg drift 

 during the experiment were approximately equal. Predictive 

 capabilities were lost due to camera failure and the resultant 

 inability to measure surface current velocity. 



Further experimentation on 23 June with an operative 

 camera indicated that surface currents could be accurately 

 measured with the available equipment and procedures. The 

 comparison of actual iceberg drift and the measured surface 

 current could not be made due to failure to relocate the 

 iceberg . 



The data obtained from the experiments on 29 and 30 June 

 is questionable. Failure to unambiguously identify the dye 

 patches and properly complete the Surface Current Data sheet 

 results in speculative interpretation of the data. This 

 interpretation shows a large difference between the average 

 Indicated surface current of 1.6 knots, 002 °T and the observed 

 iceberg drift of 0.6 knots, 137''T. This large difference 

 could be explained by the fact that icebergs have been observed 

 to trail a wake, indicating movement relative to the surface 

 current. 



The observed failure rates for the five deployments were 

 25%, 25%, 75%, 100% and 50% respectively. The average failure 

 rate for all deployments was 52%. Failures can be attributed 

 to a variety of causes, including malfunction of the parachute, 

 malfunction of the probe (presumably the clock) , strong 

 bottom currents, and the inability of personnel to differentiate 

 among the dye patches. 



B-3 



