1372.) 291 
sure whether Mr. Dunning appreciates this distinction or not, for he quotes (though 
apparently only with partial approbation) the Dresden Congress of 1858 to the 
contrary. 
It is equally clear, that, if use and not derivation determine the part of speech 
of a word, all specific names must be of the same part of speech, for they are all 
put to the same (i. e., an equivalent) use. 
There cannot be any question of a specific name being a verb or preposition, 
or, in short, anything but a noun or adjective. 
The question under discussion then seems to me to be whether all specific 
names are nouns or adjectives. 
What, then, is in language the distinction between noun and adjective P 
The distinction between the two is, to a great extent, that between the ob- 
jective and the subjective, and the ordinary definition is, that an object is a noun, 
and that a quality or condition is an adjective. 
It seems to me beyond doubt that the specific name is that of an object, and 
therefore is a noun. 
This conclusion seems to me to be irresistible, from @ logical point of view, and 
almost as strong from a practical point of view. 
The habit alluded to by Mr. Dunning, of using the specific name without the 
generic name, illustrates this: when a man says he has taken “ littoralis,” it is 
pretty clear he must refer to an object (even if the particular object be uncertain), 
for the capture of a bottleful of adjectives would not b2 more conceivable, than of 
a bag full of moonshine. 
Mr. Dunning says that “niger,” when used as a specific name, does not “ indi- 
cate a certain definite object (i.e., is not a noun)”; and he attempts to enforce this 
by asking whether it indicates Gobius niger or Hyoscyamus niger. But this is 
entirely beside the mark. Is “Turkey” not a noun, because, when written without 
context, I do not know whether it refers to a bird or to a country ? 
Again, Mr. Dunning says that the generic and specific names together con- 
stitute the name. This is quite true; but, unfortunately, does not assist us in 
arriving at any conclusion as to how we shall treat the two when temporarily sun- 
dered; this being just the very point under discussion. The specific name having 
to be divorced from the generic name for certain purposes, how shall we treat it on 
its own merits? I answer, always as a noun—and as a particular instance mention 
that it is no more necessary to change the masculine Minimus to the feminine 
Minima when moving it from a musculine-named genus to a feminine-named genus, 
than it is to change the masculine name Adonis for a feminine name when it 
undergoes a similar transmigration. The conclusion is based upon the hypothesis 
that, as names of species, Minimus and Adonis are the same part of speech, and I 
have been induced to put forward my reasons for so thinking, because I consider 
that this conclusion, if adopted, will help, if only a little, to that “consummation 
most devoutly to be wished,” a zoological nomenclature free as a whole, and in its 
separate parts, from reasons for changing it.— D. Suarp, Eccles, Thornhill, Dumfries : 
April 2nd, 1872. 
[As the discussion of this subject need not apparently be continued beyond the 
usual answer to a rejoinder, and should, at all events, be completed in the 
volume in which it was commenced, we have departed from our usual course, by 
allowing Mr. Dunning a perusal of Dr. Sharp’s remarks before printing them.—Eps. | 
On the relation between yeneric and specific names.—Dr. Sharp’s meaning was 
clearly enough expressed in his former communication, and, if I have failed to shew 
that his view is erroneous, it was not from any want of perspicuity on his part. 
