VISION. 87 
that the idea of vision must have previously existed 
before it could form part of the consciousness of 
any animal; and in the evolutions of organs of 
sight I am compelled to recognize in the simpler 
forms the early stages of a morphological design, 
moving forward in definite directions to accomplish 
a mode of contact between the external world and 
the consciousness of animals, the idea of which 
already existed. 
Is it in accordance with anything that we know 
of the laws of nature that such contact should be of 
an arbitrary and purely artificial kind? Consider 
that while we are without experience of spirit-life, 
except in connection with body, it would be credu- 
lity to suppose that no spirits exist save those 
enchained by matter. Suppose them to exist, and 
suppose them to appreciate the material universe 
in that intrinsic character which reason and not 
sense informs us of, namely, as so many centres of 
force inhabiting space, it is plain that they cannot 
have vision in the sense in which we have it—a 
sensation artificially produced through affected 
nerves. They cannot have any of our senses. But 
must they necessarily be devoid of the ideas which 
they represent? Is it necessary to suppose that 
- things which we possess in common with the 
majority of animals exist nowhere else in the whole 
