106 CONSCIOUSNESS AND SENSATION. 
pheres being simply that action of the mind excites 
their action, and that their action excites that of 
the mind. That presumption prepares the way 
for the hypothesis of sensation which I venture to 
suggest, which is this: that the consciousness extends 
Srom its special seat so far as there is continuity 
of the impressed condition ; that when an irritation 
is applied to a nerve-extremity in a finger or else- 
where, the impression (or rather impressed con- 
dition) travels as is generally understood, but 
exists for at least a moment along the whole 
length of the nerve, and that as soon as there is 
continuity of the impressed condition from finger 
to brain the consciousness is in connection with 
the nerve and is directly aware of the irritation 
at the nerve-extremity. Or the position may be 
shortly stated thus: functional continuity between 
nerve-extremity and brain is proved to be neces- 
sary for sensation, while on the other hand existence 
of distinct routes of communication between them 
is highly improbable; and seeing that functional 
continuity is sufficient of itself to explain the 
phenomena, we are not entitled to assume the 
1 A wider generalization may probably be made, namely, that every 
living element of texture exists in two conditions, the self-nutrient and 
the irritated ; and only in proportion as self-nutrition is in abeyance is 
the irritated condition possible. 
