XXIX.] THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND, 33 



but our conclusion would be wrong. The comparative 

 absence of instinctive powers, and the vast development of 

 thought, in man, makes the study of human psychology in 

 some respects misleading, if it is not corrected by com- 

 parison with that of the lower animals. But a study of 

 animal instinct shows that there are many consensual 

 actions which never can have been voluntary. The cell- Instance 

 building instinct of the bee, for instance, certainly cannot *^^ ^^''* 

 be the result of consciousness and will, either in the bee 

 itself or in any of its ancestors : I believe it to be due to 

 unconscious vital intelligence. All analogy leads to the Voluntary 

 belief that voluntary action is developed out of consensual i,een^de ^^ 

 action, and not the converse ; and consensual action has l"ped out 

 certainly been developed out of insentient or purely reflex sensual 

 action.! It is a general law, that the higher makes its ^^'^ °°"- 



SGllStl3.l 



appearance later than the lower, and is developed out of out of in- 

 the lower ; and in this particular case we know that, both ^^^^i^nt. 

 in the development of the individual and in the ascending 

 scale of organic forms, the cerebrum — which is the organ 

 of consciousness, thought, and will — makes its appearance 

 later than the sensory and motor ganglia, which are 

 the organs of consensual action ; and the sensory and 

 motor ganglia make their aj)pearance later than the 

 nervous organs of the insentient life, which, in animals 

 that have a nervous system at all, are the organs of reflex 

 action. 



The facts and theories concerning the nervoiis organs of 

 mental life, and their functions, which I have stated in 

 this chapter, may now be briefly summarized ; leaving out 

 of account the nervous organs of the insentient life; and 

 also leaving out the cerebellum, a nervous centre probably 

 belonging to the motor and instinctive life, though its 

 functions are not yet clearly ascertained. 



1 I think that Professor Bain's theoiy of the will is vitiated by not 

 attending to this truth. He represents the will as originally set in action 

 by pleasurable and painful sensation. I believe the will has its root in 

 reflex action, anterior to the origin of sensation. 



VOL. II. D 



