46 



HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE. 



[chap. 



of rela 

 tions. 



petals in contact with a green calyx. Here are the two 

 sensations of red and green, related to each other as 

 unlike, and as in contact. I am then conscious of two 

 unlike sensations in contact ; but I am not, nor can I be, 

 conscious of the abstract relations denoted by the words 

 " unhkeness " and " contact." I am not conscious of ab- 

 stract unlikeness, but I am conscious of unlike sensations ; 

 I am not conscious of abstract contact, but I am conscious 

 of sensations in contact. Eelations, in themselves, cannot 

 But we be objects of consciousness. But they are objects of 

 knowledge knowledge : this is a fact of experience, explain it logically 

 or metaphysically as we may. I consequently prefer to say 

 that we are conscious of sensations, and cognizant of the 

 relations between them. 



There is nothing new in all this. I expect that the 

 one half of my readers will say that it is a mere truism, 

 and the other half that it is a verbal distinction without 

 any meaning behind it. I have no objection to its being 

 called a truism, but 1 believe that, so far from being 

 without meaning, it shows us where to seek for the ex- 

 planation, in so far as it is exphcable, of the fact of uncon- 

 scious thought. Consciousness has to do with feelings. 

 Thought has to do with the relations between the feelings, 

 or with relations between these relations, or with a third 

 set of relations between the second set of relations, and 

 so on, in almost indefinitely increasing degrees of abstract- 

 ness ; that is to say, of remoteness from the feelings or 

 sensations on which all thought is nevertheless ultinaately 

 based. (I do not offer this as a complete account of the 

 objects of thought, but only as an account of how thought 

 arises.) Now, it is possible to go on thinking of the rela- 

 tions, and the relations between the relations, after we have 

 of^rda^*^^ ceased to be conscious of the feelings which were the 

 tions only, subjects of the relations. And this, I believe, is the 

 clusicm'of rationale of the fact of unconscious thought, 

 the feel- jt may be said in reply to this, that, if it were true, 



ill2fS 



between mathematical and all highly abstract reasonings would be 

 which the performed unconsciously. I reply to the objection, that I 

 are. believe such reasonings are in a great degree performed 



Uncon- 

 scious 

 thought 

 thus ex- 

 plained. 



Thought 

 ceases to 

 be con- 

 scious 



