CHAPTER XXVIIT. 



MIND. 



IN writing such a work as this, it would be an obvious 

 proceeding to begin the chapters on mind, or mental 

 Pctiiiiiiou life, by a definition of mind. So far as I see, however, 

 sible.''" ^^^^ -^^ ^^^ possible. It would be plausible to define 

 mind as conscious life ; but, as we shall see, there are 

 mental actions which are not conscious. It would be 

 plausible also to define mind as intelligence ; but, if the 

 conclusions of the last few chapters are correct, intelligence 

 does not belong to mental life alone, but to all life what- 

 ever. The want of any exact definition, however, need not 

 embarrass us much.^ 

 Mind is It is the mere statement of a fact to say, that mind 



ourof ^^*^ begins with sensation, and is developed out of sensation, 

 sensation. But it is equally true, that sensation does not constitute 

 mind. Something more is needed ; and I believe the 

 common view is perfectly accurate, that this something 

 Conscious- is consciousness. 



Jiess : What, then, is consciousness 1 I believe that conscious- 



ness, like sensation, is in itself utterly incapable of being 

 inexiili- explained ; all that we can do is to define the relations of 

 cable. sensation and consciousness to each other, and to ascertain 

 the biological conditions under which they arise. 



1 H. Spencer (see his Principles of Psychology) regards mind as the life 

 of external relation, in so far ad this is distinct from the nutritive life. I 

 think, however, this is doubly inaccurate. It would include, as a mental 

 phenomenon, the act of a climbing plant in swinging its tendrils in order 

 to catch something (vol. i. pp. 167, 178) ; and, so far as I can see, it would 

 exclude those thoughts and emotions which have no tendency to lead to 

 action. 



