Xll CONTENTS OF VOL. II. 



develoijed out of tlie seuse of sight only : its consciousuess would be developed 

 in both time and space — Illustration — What is meant by thinking in space — 

 Possibility of a consciousness independent of time — Instance of this being 

 believed in Pp. 133—142 



CHAPTER XXXVIII. 



TIME, SPACE, AXD CAUSATION. 



I hold the experience theory of our knowledge of space and time in preference to 

 that of forms of thought — But the experience is inherited : so that the results 

 of the experience of the race become fonns of thought for the individual — 

 Herbert Spencer — The problem stated: How have space and time become 

 forms of thought ? — Is the fact ultimate, or a result of experience ? — The ex- 

 perience theory — The ideal theory — The ideal theoiy was consistent with the 

 psychology of Kant's time — Further conclusion, that space and time are unreal, 

 adjnitted by Kant — The experience theoiy is consistent with our psychology — 

 JS^otion that idealism is favourable to faith — I think the reverse — Kant was kept 

 from scepticism by his faith, in spite of his philosophy — The experience theoiy 

 makes our knowledge to be true, though limited, and is a possible basis of belief 

 — Causation, like space and time, is cognised directly, by coming within the 

 sphere of consciousness — Causation is cognised in becoming conscious of mental 

 action — There is no direct cognition of the will as the cause of muscular action 

 — How we learn to identify physical and mental causation as cases of the same 

 law — Imaginary case of a being with thought, but no motor powers — Where 

 I agree with MUl, and where I differ — Summary — Belief in the infinity of 

 space and time — Difference between our belief of an eternal past and of an 

 eternal future. 



Note: The Philosophy of Kant: — The system of Kant's "Pure Reason" is 

 idealism, identical with scepticism : that of liis "Practical Reason" is faith. 



Pp. 14.3—151 



CHAPTER XXXIX. 



MENTAL IN T E L 1. 1 G E N C E. 



The most important question of biology is whether intelligence is a primary fact 

 —I have argued the affirmative of organizing intelligence, and have now to 

 argue it of mental— Difficulty of the latter question— There are no innate ideas 

 — Thought begins from experience — Element of intelligence in all thought 

 which is not a result of experience — Association will account for conceptions, 



but not for beliefs — Belief in the constancy of the order of things How is 



this acquii-ed ?— Some say by habit only— I think this is no explanation- 

 Belief is subject to the laws of habit, but habit cannot produce belief— Phy- 

 sical analogy — Objection from the inconstancy of the weather answered — The 

 constancy of the order of things is not certain, but only probable : but it is certain 

 to be constant unless interruiited— In what sense the law of causation is self- 

 evident- This confidence is presupposed in action, and in desire and fear— The 



