Viii CONTENTS OF VOL. II. 



CHAPTER XXXII. 



THE GROtrxp.S OF THE MORAL NATVRE. 



Definition — Moral means emotional — Moral is contrasted with intellectual — The 

 root of the moral nature is in the sense of pleasure and pain — Pleasure and 

 pain are inexplicable in themselves, hut it may he possible to teU how they 

 arise — Organic intelligence guides all organisms to do what is for their welfare 

 — Sentient organisms are guided to their welfare by sensation — Exceptions — 

 Keason for thinking the law must be general — Desire and fear — Love of life — 

 Sexual, domestic, and social affections : their i-oots in the organic life — Great 

 changes are injurious, slight ones beneficial : gi'eat changes are painful, slight 

 ones agreeable — Application of this principle to beauty — Roots of emotions in 

 the organic life — Emotions generated by association — Association of feelings — 

 Love of money not a primary feeling : may have become hereditary — Emotions 

 have their seat in the nerves of consciousness — Germ of the moral nature in 

 sensation — Prudence — Unselfishness — Holiness — Origin of jjrudence : of unsel- 

 fishness : of holiness — The sense of holiness is a case of intelligence. 



Pp. 56—64 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 



MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 



Is sensation mental ? — The question is only verbal — Mind begins with sensation — 

 Feelings of sensation and of consciousness, or bodily and mental feelings : their 

 anatomical grounds : no fundamental distinction — Sensation — Consciousness — 

 Thought — "Will — Relation of thought and will to the insentient life — Analogy 

 of mental to organic development — Inter-action of functions in mind — Deve- 

 lopment of thought, feeling, aud will — Consensual and voluntary actions — 

 Intermediate class — Sensation aud consciousness both inexplicable — Develop- 

 ment of memory, from consciousness outlasting sensation — Necessity of this to 

 thought — Hearing words and sentences — Memory is developed by the law of 

 association — Reverie — Recollection, or voluntary memory — Children have 

 memory with little power of recollection — Only what has been attended to can 

 be recollected — Imagination — Continuance of impressions — Memory — Recollec- 

 tion — Imagination — Development of reasoning out of cognition of relations — 

 Elementary relations — Likeness — Succession — Space-relation — Causation — Re- 

 lations presupposed in association — Perception — Perception may have its seat 

 in the sensory ganglia — Man's superiority in reasoning — Power of directing 

 thought at will — Language — Abstraction — "VThately's view on language — Use of 

 words in thought, due to the power of directing thought at will : whence also 

 the power of 'abstraction — Instance in arithmetic — Voluntary action is always 

 later developed than involuntarj' — Simple inference and abstract reasoning 

 — jSIora] nature dcncloped out of the sense of pleasure and pain — Care for 



