CH. xxxil.] GROUNDS OF THE MORAL NATURE. 57 



I am inclined to think that intelligence is in itself abso- 

 lutely unerring, and that when it does not guide the 

 actions of the organism aright, it is because the action 

 of intelligence has been interfered with and counteracted 

 by other and unintelligent forces : just as gravitation is a 

 universal and unceasing force ; and when bodies do not 

 fall towards each other, it is because they are prevented. 

 But this, as regards intelligence, does not admit of proof. 



All organisms, as I believe, are intelligent, but only 

 some organisms are sentient. All organisms, as a general 

 rule, seek what is good for their life and health and 

 avoid what is bad for them. Insentient organisms, as I 

 believe, are guided in so doing by their imconscious 

 organic intelligence ; but when sensation is developed, Sentient 

 and with it the power of discriminating between pleasure °yf^^lij^d 

 and pain, the sense of pleasure and pain becomes a guide : to their 

 what is healthful is felt as agreeable, and as such is sensation, 

 sought ; what is destructive or injurious is felt as dis- 

 agreeable, and as such is avoided. Not that intelligence 

 abdicates its functions. The connexion between the 

 animal's welfare and the sense of pleasure, and the con- 

 verse connexion between injury and the sense of pain, 

 is, I have no doubt, in some way determined by intelli- 

 gence. The law that what is beneficial is agreeable, and 

 what is injurious is disagreeable, is no doubt subject to 

 very puzzling exceptions, of which the most remarkable, ^^<=^P" 

 and indeed the typical, instances are the sweet tastes of 

 some poisonous substances. These, in the present state of 

 our knowledge, must stand over as inexplicable anomalies. 

 But I am convinced that they are only exceptions ; for, 

 when organisms are sentient, the guidance of their lives. Reason for 

 at least as to the choice of food, appears to be entirely the^iaw^ 

 committed to the sense of what is agreeable and disagree- must be 

 j,ble in taste ; and if this sense habitually gave such 

 indications as to guide the organism wrong instead of 

 right, the whole race of such organisms would speedily 

 perish. 



The sense of actually felt pleasure and pain is the root Desire and 

 of the desire of pleasure and of the fear of pain ; so that, 



