XXXII.] THE GKOUNDS OF THE MORAL NATURE. 63 



The sense of pleasure and pain, with the desire of plea- Germ of 

 sure and the fear of pain, constitute the germ out of which nature^in 

 the whole of our moral and emotional nature is developed, sensation. 

 But though they are emotional, these elements cannot be 

 themselves regarded as moral. There are three things in 

 which morality or moral excellence consists. These are : 



1. Preferring the future to the present ; or prudence. Prudence. 



2. Preferring the interest of another to one's own ; the Uuselfish- 

 social virtues, or unselfishness. '^*'^^- 



3. Preferring a higher aim to a lower one ; as, for in- 

 stance, preferring the performance of a duty which is 

 certain to be unrewarded, to pleasure ; I cannot think of 

 any word that properly distinguishes this class of virtues 



from the other two, except holiness. Holiness. 



In morality, as in all life, the higher is developed out of 

 the lower, and presupposes the lower. Prudence, unselfish- 

 ness, and holiness are all developed out of the preference of 

 pleasure to pain. Out of the sense of pleasure and pain Origin of 

 in the present arises prudence, or care to provide for P^i^deuce : 

 pleasure, and against pain, in the future ; and the readi- 

 ness to forego a smaller present pleasure, or to endure a 

 smaller present pain, in order to provide for greater future 

 pleasure, or against greater future pain. Out of the of unsel- 

 sense of one's own pleasure and pain arises unselfishness, "s'^'^''^® • 

 or care for the welfare of others. And out of the pleasures 

 and pains, the desires and fears, of mere sensation, arise of 

 those feelings which belong to a higher order than sensa- l^oli'^ess. 

 tion — love of beau.ty, love of truth, and love of virtue. 



Concerning the origin of prudence, there is no room 

 for doubt, and not much, so far as I see, even for dis- 

 cussion ; it necessarily arises when thought and will have 

 obtained the ascendency over mere sensation and con- 

 sensual action. 



The origin of the unselfish virtues is a subject which 

 has been very much debated. I have stated my reasons 

 for believing that they have their roots in those instincts 

 which prompt all organisms, sentient and insentient alike, 

 to perform such actions as are needful for the preservation 

 of the race. 



