66 HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE. [chap. 



or bodily I have just usecl the common expression of "bodily and 

 fe'din^sf ^ mental feelings," to signify what I have previously called 

 feelings of sensation and feelings of consciousness. The 

 common expression is perfectly accurate, if we accurately 

 understand what it really means, and do not let ourselves 

 be hampered by preconceived notions about the mutual 

 relation of the body and the mind. Bodily feelings are 

 those whicli originate in impressions on the body ; mental 

 feelings are those which originate within the mind itself.^ 

 their To speak in anatomical language : bodily feelings, or feel- 



anatomical jjjo.g Qf sensation, are those which are due to the action 



grounds : ° t -^i j^t 



of the nerves that connect the sensory gangba with the 

 various parts of the body ; mental feelings, or feelings of 

 consciousness, are due to the action of the nerves that 

 connect the sensory ganglia with the ganglionic substance 

 of the cerebral hemispheres.^ But our own consciousness 

 of our mental states unites with reasoning based on 

 no funda- physiological anatomy, in testifying that there is no fun- 

 t^ction'^^^ damental difference between the feelings of sensation and 

 those of consciousness. 



Sensation. Besides sensation, we have seen that the mental func- 

 tions are aU to be classed under the three following 

 heads : — 



Conscious- 1. Consciousness ; to which belong the feelings of con- 



'^^^^^ sciousness, also called the mental feelings, or the emotions.^ 



Consciousness has its root in sensation. 



Thought. 2. Thought ; which, as I believe, has its root in the 

 unconscious vital intelligence that belongs to all living 

 beings. And 



Will. 3. Will ; which has its root in involuntary motor action. 



It may be said that I have here contradicted myseK, by 



saying in one breath that sensation is the germ out of 



1 See the chapter on the Laws of Mind, in Mill's Logic, vol. ii. 



• I ought not to put forward an hypothesis, of which part of tlie details 

 have been, so far as I am aware, first thought out by myself, as if it were 

 a proved theory, though I am myself convinced of its truth. See the 

 chapter on the Physiology of Mind. 



2 See Note at end of chapter. 



