XXXIII.] MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 69 



voluntary in a sense nearly synonymous with mentally voluntary 

 determined, and I shall class as voluntary all actions the ^° ^°^^" 

 impulse to which comes, as I believe, along the nerves of 

 will ; although they may not be voluntary in the highest 

 sense, of being at our choice to do or not to do. I mean 

 such actions as yielding to fear against one's better judgment, 

 or attending to something that one would rather not listen 

 to. Such actions are of intermediate character between inter- ' 

 consensual actions and those which are in the highest ^J^diate 



° class. 



sense voluntary. 



The development of merely consensual or sense-deter- 

 mined nervous action into will is, perhaps, the greatest of 

 the mysteries in the whole of the mysterious realm of life. ' 

 I am unable to throw any further light upon it ; and as the 

 question of the freedom of the will does not fall within the 

 province of the present work, I shall at once go on to the 

 subject of the development of thought and feeling out of 

 sensation. 



As I have already stated, I regard the consciousness of 

 a sensation as a distinct thing from the sensation itself ; Sensation 

 and I believe that consciousness is equally inexplicable g^iousTess 

 with sensation. Without consciousness, no higher mental ^'o.th i'lex- 

 function than mere sensation could be developed ; though ^ ^°^ 

 thought and will are not forms of consciousness, and though 

 they sometimes, as we have seen, act unconsciously, yet 

 consciousness appears to be a necessary condition of their 

 development. But the mere consciousness of sensation 

 could not give origin to thought or emotion. I shall speak 

 first of the development of thought, or the intellectual 

 nature. 



The consciousness of a sensation usually — indeed, I think Develop- 

 always — in some slight degree outlasts the sensation itself ™omory, 

 This is memory in its simplest and most rudimentary f'o'n con- 

 form ; and, as remarked before, it is no doubt due to some outlasting 

 peculiar property iu the nerves of consciousness.^ This is a sensation. 

 primary property of consciousness, and is not in any way due 

 to thought or association. It is obvious tliat this much of 



1 See p. 29, 



