120 



HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE. 



[CHAF- 



Percep- 

 tion, aud 

 the cogni- 

 tion of 

 space, are 

 distinct, 

 but have 

 been con- 

 founded. 



We 



cognise 



space 



before we 



perceive 



objects 



in it. 



Cognition 

 of two 



sensations 

 as sepa- 

 rated in 

 space. 



as an instantaneous inference. The next question to con- 

 sider is the nature and origin of our cognition of space. 

 These two questions — how we perceive, and how we become 

 cognizant of space — are nearly always confounded ; and 

 this confusion has its expression in the use of the term 

 "the external world," as synonymous with "the world 

 existmg in space." The two may be identical in fact, but 

 they are not necessarily identical in thought. "VVe may 

 conceive a being with consciousness and thought like -our 

 own, but with no sense except that of hearing. Such a 

 being could not possibly acquire any idea of space, yet it 

 might pterceive — that is to say, might infer — the existence 

 of a world external to itself On the other hand, I believe 

 it is possible to be cognizant of space, and of relations in 

 space, without perceiving an external world as existing 

 in space ; and not only so, but I believe we necessarily 

 cognise the existence of sensations as related in space, 

 before we perceive the objects to which we refer the sen- 

 sations ; in other words, that we must have cognised space 

 before we can begin to perceive objects as existing in space. 

 I go on to state more fully the way in which, as I 

 believe, we cognise space. When I speak of two or more 

 sensations, I must be understood as meaning sensations of 

 the same sense. Let us imagine what may take place 

 when consciousness is being first awakened by sensation. 

 A ray of heat falls on a spot of skin ; this is cognised as 

 simply a sensation, and nothing more. A second ray of 

 equal intensity falls on the same spot of skin ; this is not 

 cognised as a distinct sensation, only the first sensation is 

 now cognised as having increased in intensity. But let 

 the second ray fall on a different spot of skin ; this will be 

 cognised as a distinct sensation, in all respects similar to 

 the first, but separated from it in space. This, I believe, is 

 the elementary form of the cognition of space. It is, in 

 my opinion, a case of pure primary cognition, without any 

 element of inference; just like the cognition of unlikeness 

 that would be produced if the two sensations were different. 

 Or, instead of supposing a second sensation at some distance 

 from the first, let us sunno'^e that the warm spot is moved 



