CHAPTER XXXVII. 



THE RELATION OF THE MIXD TO SPACE AND TIME. 



TN the last chapter^ I have endeavoured to show that 

 -■- our first rudimeutary knowledge of space consists in 

 the cognition of sensations as being situated in different 

 parts of the body, and consequently related to each other 

 in space. It seems inconceivable that the existence, at 

 the same time, of sensations in different parts of the sentient 

 organism should not give rise to a rudimentary cognition 

 of space; whether these are sensations of pressure or of 

 heat in different parts of the skin, or sensations of colour 

 in different parts of the retina. And besides, as I have 

 shown, this theory of the origin of the cognition of space 

 accounts for the fact, that our spontaneous thoughts of 

 space or extension are more apt to be of a surface than of 

 either a line or a solid. 



It is not disputed by any, that our knowledge of time is Our kuow- 

 an immediate and primary cognition ; that is to say, we l?'^o*^.of 

 become cognizant of time in the act of cognising our primary 

 feelings as succeeding each other in time. But concern- we'cocm^se 

 ing our cognition of space there is great diversity of time in 

 opinion. One school, which 1 believe is the prevalent our sen- 

 one in Germany, and with which I agree, maintains that s^tions as 



•' _ . . successive. 



the cognition of space is equally immediate and primary 



with that of time : in other words, that as we cognise i believe 



time by the succession of sensations in time, so we origi- ^P^^*: '^ 



"' _ . cognised 



nally cognise space by the separation of sensations in in a 

 space. This is a statement, though too brief to be com- "^^^^ ® 

 plete, of the theory on the subject which I have en- 

 deavoured to prove in the last chapter. Another school, 



